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  INTRODUCTION   
In 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) will take full effect.1 With its intimidating length and 
complex provisions, the ACA means many things to many peo-
ple. On the one hand, it is a health-insurance statute, designed 
to extend coverage to the un- and under-insured. On the other, 
it is public health legislation, geared toward improving the 
overall health and wellness of Americans. It contains provisions 
dealing with prescription drug regulation, funding for health 
education, and fraud and abuse.2
Legislation bearing on disability has traditionally been di-
vided into two distinct substantive areas of protection: (1) legis-
lation regulating health-care access and promoting public 
health and welfare (“health law”) and (2) legislation furthering 
equality, access, and integration (“civil rights law”). “Health 
law” encompasses statutes and regulations that provide public 
health insurance and benefits, govern the private health-
insurance industry, and promote public health. Examples in-
clude Medicare and Medicaid, the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act, and statutes requiring federally funded 
entities to collect and report health-related data. Alternatively, 
“civil rights law” is designed to promote equality, access, and 
integration. Disability rights statutes serve these goals by pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. The primary 
disability antidiscrimination statutes are the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
 However, this Article argues 
that the ACA functions as yet another kind of law: civil rights 
law. Specifically, the statute may be understood as a disability 
rights law. Although not yet widely recognized as such, the 
ACA constitutes one of the most significant civil rights victories 
for the disability community in recent history. 
 
 1. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 2. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, 1 HEALTH CARE REFORM SPECIAL 
ALERT § 1.01 (2010) (providing an overview of history and provisions of the 
ACA). 
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Until the disability rights movement of the last forty years, 
disability legislation consisted almost exclusively of social wel-
fare protections, some of which fall under the broad umbrella of 
health law. However, when disability rights advocates mobi-
lized in the 1970s, they reframed the disadvantages faced by 
people with disabilities from personal, medical problems to the 
consequences of pervasive, society-wide stigma and discrimina-
tion. In promoting independence for individuals with disabili-
ties, advocates renounced the charity-driven paternalism of the 
existing social-benefits system, resulting in a move toward an-
tidiscrimination protections as the preferred means for accom-
plishing their goals. 
Yet despite the groundswell of support within the disability 
rights movement, civil rights laws have failed to address the 
serious health disparities that the disability community faces. 
People with disabilities encounter numerous barriers to access-
ing health care. For instance, Medicaid and Medicare often fail 
to cover needed health services and medical equipment. Moreo-
ver, for individuals with disabilities who do not qualify for pub-
lic programs, the risk assessment and cost-sharing practices of 
the private health-insurance industry frequently render them 
un- or under-insured. Finally, public health authorities have 
historically failed to compile information related to disability, 
making the extent of these disparities difficult to assess. Alt-
hough both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA facially apply 
in health-care settings, those statutes have been ineffective at 
targeting these inequities because of their civil rights structure. 
The statutes’ vulnerability to restrictive court interpretations, 
coupled with their focus on individual instances of discrimina-
tion, make civil rights law an inappropriate tool for challenging 
health disparities. 
Quite intuitively, the solution to the inequities experienced 
by individuals with disabilities in health care appears to rest—
not in civil rights law—but in health law. Both scholars and ac-
tivists alike have proposed that the future of disability rights 
lies in protections traditionally associated with health legisla-
tion. The ACA makes that proposal a reality. The statute in-
cludes multiple provisions that both explicitly and implicitly 
benefit people with disabilities, including its attempted expan-
sion of Medicaid and public health-insurance coverage for on-
going care, its elimination of preexisting condition exclusions 
and limitations on health status-based rating, and its recogni-
tion of people with disabilities as a health disparities group.  
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By promoting the interests of people with disabilities, the 
ACA demonstrates that a health law can function as a civil 
rights law. That is to say, legislation written with health law 
objectives and content may have a civil rights impact, such as 
furthering equality, access, and integration. More broadly, the 
ACA exemplifies how advocates can harness law outside the 
traditional civil rights paradigm to achieve their goals. 
This Article, therefore, asserts that laws may have mean-
ingful effects outside their substantive paradigms. In so doing, 
it makes a novel distinction between a law’s articulated pur-
pose and that law’s practical impact. It is an article about the 
effectiveness of statutes, not their superficial substantive clas-
sification. Moreover, this Article provides the first broad, in-
depth reading of recent health-care reform in terms of disabil-
ity rights. Specifically, it argues that, although not explicitly 
framed as disability rights legislation, the ACA still functions 
as such. Thus, this Article establishes that non-civil rights 
statutes can affect civil rights outcomes, a useful insight in this 
context and beyond. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I limns the histor-
ical division between the health and civil rights paradigms 
within disability law and proposes the potential reasons for 
that divide. Part II explores the disparities in health-care ac-
cess experienced by people with disabilities and the failure of 
traditional civil rights legislation to address these inequities 
adequately. Finally, Part III reads the ACA as a piece of disa-
bility rights legislation, examining the role of disability rights 
organizations in its passage and the statute’s impact on indi-
viduals with disabilities. The ACA therefore demonstrates that 
health legislation may act as a vehicle for civil rights. The Arti-
cle concludes that to achieve holistic equality for people with 
disabilities, disability rights advocates must move beyond the 
civil rights paradigm by integrating other kinds of legal protec-
tions into their agendas for change. This valuable lesson ap-
plies both beyond the realm of health law and beyond the needs 
of the disability community. 
I.  “HEALTH” AND “CIVIL RIGHTS”: COMPETING 
PARADIGMS   
This Article proposes that portions of the ACA function as 
disability rights law. Disability legislation has traditionally 
fallen into two separate, substantive categories: one intended to 
provide health care and resources to people with disabilities 
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and one intended to promote their equality, access, and inte-
gration. Thus, insofar as the ACA represents a health law that 
furthers the rights of people with disabilities, it constitutes a 
departure from this conventional division. Part I explores the 
concept of disability as it pertains to both health and civil 
rights laws, traces the historical schism between those frame-
works, and provides some explanations for that divide. 
A. TRADITIONAL SCHISM 
Disability is conceptually complex, incorporating social, le-
gal, and medical aspects.3 Not surprisingly, the law has strug-
gled regarding what qualifies as a disability and how to protect 
individuals within this large and diverse category.4 Given the 
increased need for health care faced by many individuals with 
disabilities, the law has at times framed “disability” as a medi-
cal designation. However, people with disabilities also face sig-
nificant social barriers, which stem not from medical need but 
from stigma and stereotype. Consequently, the law has also de-
fined “disability” in terms of the social experiences of exclusion, 
disadvantage, and discrimination. The result has been a sub-
stantive split between the health and civil rights protections for 
individuals with disabilities.5
 
 3. Defining “disability” has been an on-going source of debate. At various 
points in time, disability has held differing connotations: social, medical, and 
even moral. See generally Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Per-
spective of the Disability Community, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 352 (2000) 
(examining the historically complex task of defining a person with a disability, 
as well as the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of disability under the 
ADA); Simi Linton, Reassigning Meaning, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 
223, 223–36 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
 
 4. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommo-
dation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); 
see also Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Ac-
commodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 579 (2004). 
 5. I am not the first disability legal scholar to identify this distinction. 
Most famously, Samuel Bagenstos differentiated between types of legal protec-
tions for people with disabilities in his groundbreaking article, The Future of 
Disability Law, describing them as the “antidiscrimination” and “social wel-
fare” paradigms. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 
YALE L.J. 1 (2004). Similarly, Ani Satz has explored the limits of antidiscrimi-
nation law and the “targeted legal approach” in her scholarship on fragmenta-
tion. See Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimi-
nation, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513 (2008) [hereinafter Satz, Disability, 
Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination]; Ani B. Satz, Fragmented 
Lives: Disability Discrimination and the Role of “Environment-Framing,” 68 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 187 (2011) [hereinafter Satz, Fragmented Lives]; Ani B. 
Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability and Health Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 
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1. Health Law and Disability 
Health law encompasses several kinds of legal protections.6 
For the purposes of this Article, “health law” connotes laws that 
govern access to health services and health insurance coverage, 
as well as those intended to restore or promote health and 
wellness.7
a. Public Benefits and Disability 
 It, therefore, focuses on three kinds of substantive 
health law protections: (1) public health insurance and gov-
ernment benefits; (2) laws governing private health insurance; 
and (3) public health initiatives and regulation. All three kinds 
of health law protections relate to people with disabilities. 
Before the advent of the disability rights movement of the 
1970s and 1980s, “disability law” consisted almost exclusively 
of social welfare statutes.8 In the United States, people with 
disabilities tend to seek health insurance in the public sector—
frequently from Medicare and Medicaid—due to the various 
risk-assessment and cost-reducing mechanisms common in the 
private insurance industry.9
 
277 (2010) [hereinafter Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation]. 
  
Notably, Bagenstos and Satz focus primarily on social welfare as a legal 
category. Alternatively, while the health law model I describe includes social 
welfare protections, it also incorporates private insurance and public health 
law, making it a broader designation. 
 6. Practicing health law may concurrently incorporate aspects of admin-
istrative law, contracts, corporate law, torts, and even criminal law. Jennifer 
A. Stiller, What is Health Law?, in HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1:1 (2011). 
Thus, health law practitioners must integrate multiple fields of legal exper-
tise, including professional licensure and regulation, tax, fraud and abuse, an-
titrust, medical malpractice (and other torts), insurance law, and various oth-
er specialties—pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and intellectual property to 
name a few—depending on the scope of their practice. Id. 
 7. Samuel Bagenstos defines his “social welfare approach” as “sustained 
and direct government intervention through such means as public funding and 
provision of services.” See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 55. Thus, the “health 
law paradigm” as used in this Article describes the substance and purpose of 
the legislation, i.e., its goal of promoting and sustaining health, whereas 
Bagenstos’s “social welfare approach” describes how the programs created by 
that legislation are provided, i.e., through government intervention. Thus, 
while public health initiatives are part of the “health law paradigm,” insofar 
as they don’t confer some kind of a tangible benefit, they may not fall within 
the “social welfare approach.” 
 8. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 10 (describing pre-1970s “disability law” 
as “effectively nothing more than a subcategory of social welfare law”). Many 
of these benefits provision policies date back as far as the Civil War era. Id. 
 9. Id. at 32 (explaining that “limitations on private insurance coverage 
have driven people with disabilities into the public health care system, pri-
marily Medicare and Medicaid”). These mechanisms include preexisting condi-
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People with disabilities may qualify for public health in-
surance. Often, that eligibility is linked to government wage 
benefits. Individuals with disabilities can apply for two differ-
ent programs pursuant to the Social Security Act: Social Secu-
rity Disability Insurance (SSDI) under Title II and Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI. SSDI pays 
benefits to recipients based on their previous wage contribu-
tions.10 Thus, only individuals with disabilities who have 
worked may apply.11 After two years of SSDI enrollment, bene-
ficiaries become eligible for federally provided health insurance 
under Medicare.12 Alternatively, SSI is a means-tested pro-
gram: eligibility is based only on the applicant’s current in-
come.13 SSI, therefore, provides wage support—regardless of 
work history—to certain enumerated groups.14 SSI recipients 
are eligible for public health insurance under Medicaid.15 Indi-
viduals with disabilities may receive benefits simultaneously 
from both programs; however a recipient’s SSDI benefits are 
included when calculating her SSI eligibility.16 Thus, four social 
welfare programs apply to individuals with disabilities—two 
providing cash benefits and two providing public health-
insurance coverage.17
 
tion exclusions and lifetime and annual caps. For a discussion of the negative 
impact of traditional private, for-profit health insurance practices on individu-
als with disabilities, see discussion, infra notes 
 
21–35 and accompanying text 
and infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
 10. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2012 RED BOOK: A SUMMARY GUIDE TO EMPLOY-
MENT SUPPORTS FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURI-
TY DISABILITY INSURANCE AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAMS, 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/redbook/eng/main.htm [hereinafter SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., RED BOOK]. Thus, Samuel Bagenstos characterizes SSDI as “early re-
tirement pay.” Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 11. 
 11. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 11 (explaining that SSDI applies to work-
ers who have contributed to the Social Security trust fund). 
 12. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DISABILITY BENEFITS 14 (June 2012). 
 13. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., RED BOOK, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that “[t]he 
SSI program makes cash assistance payments to aged, blind, and disabled 
persons (including children) who have limited income and resources”). 
 14. See id. 
 15. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) 10 (2012) 
(directing SSI recipients to their local welfare or medical assistance office for 
information about Medicaid). 
 16. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., RED BOOK, supra note 10, at 7 (describing receiving 
both SSDI and SSI benefits as “concurrent benefits”). 
 17. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 11 (discussing disability benefits pro-
grams). 
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b. Private Health Insurance and Disability 
Laws governing private health insurers also constitute 
part of the health law universe. Yet in this context, one can 
perhaps learn more about the effect of health law on people 
with disabilities from where regulation is absent, rather than 
where it is present. Private health insurers have historically 
engaged in a variety of practices that, although not explicitly 
dealing with disability, have systematically disadvantaged the 
chronically ill and disabled.18 With some notable exceptions, 
such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA), health insurance law is by and large an area of regu-
lation left to the states. It typically deals with setting stand-
ards for insurers (including access to coverage, required bene-
fits, and premium rates), regulating market conduct, and 
fielding complaints.19 Yet, until recently, the law of health in-
surance did not intervene to mitigate many of the industry 
practices that disadvantage people with disabilities.20
In the private sector, health insurers obtain their profits by 
accurately assessing the risks of their insureds.
 
21 One histori-
cally common mechanism for differentiating between good and 
bad health risks impacts many individuals with disabilities: 
the preexisting condition exclusion. Health insurers have used 
preexisting conditions to deny or to limit coverage. Prior to 
health-care reform, insurers cited preexisting conditions to jus-
tify denying coverage to one in seven applicants.22
 
 18. See Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimina-
tion Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1159, 1166 (“In private, for-profit health-insurance, both individual and 
group health insurers have historically engaged in risk-assessment and other 
profit-maximizing strategies that systematically disadvantage people with his-
tories of illness and chronic health conditions.”); see also Mary Crossley, Dis-
crimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73 
(2005) [hereinafter Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy]; Elizabeth 
Pendo, Working Sick: Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care Reform, 9 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 453 (2009) [hereinafter Pendo, Working 
Sick]. 
 In addition 
 19. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE WORKS: A 
PRIMER 2008 UPDATE 813 (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
insurance/upload/7766.pdf. 
 20. The ACA addresses many of the provisions that adversely affect peo-
ple with disabilities. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 21. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 1162. 
 22. Memorandum from Henry A. Waxman & Bart Stupak to Members of 
the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Coverage Denials for Pre-Existing Condi-
tions in the Individual Health Insurance Market (Oct. 12, 2010) (finding that 
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to denying an individual outright,23 a private health insurer 
may offer the applicant a policy that excludes coverage for a 
particular condition if that condition pre-dates the individual’s 
application for health insurance.24 Preexisting conditions may 
include any number of conditions, ranging from life-threatening 
to purely cosmetic.25
Pricing premiums based on health status may also dispar-
ately affect people with disabilities who apply for private health 
insurance. When setting rates and premiums, health insurers 
traditionally evaluate their potential insureds’ health histo-
ries.
 Consequently, impairments that rise to 
the level of disability almost always represent the kind of 
preexisting condition that would impede one’s access to health 
insurance. 
26
 
“[f]rom 2007 through 2009, the four largest for-profit health insurance compa-
nies, Aetna, Humana, UnitedHealth Group, and WellPoint, refused to issue 
health insurance coverage to more than 651,000 people based on their prior 
medical history” and that “[o]n average, the four companies denied coverage to 
one out of every seven applicants based on a pre-existing condition”). 
 Individuals who have required more health services in 
the past are thus more likely to require health services in the 
future, thereby increasing the likelihood that the insurance 
company will at some point pay out for a claim. As a result, 
 23. Id. 
 24. DICTIONARY OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE 226 (David 
Edward Marcinko ed., 2006) (defining “preexisting condition” as “[i]n health 
insurance, an injury, sickness, or physical condition that existed before the 
policy effective date. Most individual policies will not cover a preexisting con-
dition; most group policies will.”); see also Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for 
the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 287, 304 (1993) 
(“Pre-existing condition clauses exclude payment for any condition the appli-
cant had prior to the insurance contract.”). Importantly, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) placed some limits on group in-
surers’ ability to impose preexisting condition exclusions. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1181(a)(1) (2006) (stating that insurers may only impose a preexisting condi-
tion exclusion when “(1) such exclusion relates to a condition (whether physi-
cal or mental), regardless of the cause of the condition, for which medical ad-
vice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was recommended or received within the 6-
month period ending on the enrollment date; (2) such exclusion extends for a 
period of not more than 12 months (or 18 months in the case of a late enrollee) 
after the enrollment date; and (3) the period of any such preexisting condition 
exclusion is reduced by the aggregate of the periods of creditable coverage”). 
 25. Anything from AIDS to acne may be considered a preexisting condi-
tion. See KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW ACCESSIBLE IS 
INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR CONSUMERS IN LESS-THAN-PERFECT 
HEALTH? 1 (2001), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/20010620a-index 
.cfm. 
 26. Roberts, supra note 18, at 1165. 
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health insurers charge more to insure “high-risk” applicants.27 
People with disabilities—who as a group use health services 
more frequently—therefore often pay higher rates for private 
health insurance.28
Although preexisting condition exclusions and health-
status based rating have been characteristic of the individual 
insurance market, people with disabilities may likewise experi-
ence disadvantages in group health insurance. Group health 
insurers also engage in several cost-sharing practices—such as 
deductibles, co-insurance, and co-payments—that result in 
insureds with higher health-care costs paying more out-of-
pocket.
 
29 Finally, both annual and lifetime caps on coverage 
force individuals in need of on-going care to cover significant 
portions of their treatment costs.30
Ironically, having an increased need for health services of-
ten makes attaining those services more challenging for people 
with disabilities, either because private health insurers are less 
likely to cover them or because the available policies contain 
cost- or coverage-limiting provisions.
 All of these practices have a 
disproportionate impact on people with disabilities, who as a 
group tend to consume more health services. 
31
 
 27. Stone, supra note 
 Even prior to the ACA, 
24, at 306 (explaining that health insurers may in-
crease premiums and limit coverage for high-risk individuals). 
 28. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE CURRENT STATE OF HEALTH CARE 
FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 46 (2009) (stating that “purchasers [with disa-
bilities] are often charged premiums that are higher than those charged to in-
dividuals without disabilities”). 
 29. Id.; see also Pendo, Working Sick, supra note 18, at 466–67. 
 30. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 27–28 (describing the effect of preexisting 
condition exclusions and annual and lifetime caps on people with disabilities). 
 31. See Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA’s Impact on Health 
Care for Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 83 (2000) [hereinafter 
Crossley, Becoming Visible] (“[I]n many cases . . . high-risk enrollees whom 
insurers try to avoid are individuals who have a chronic medical condition or 
some other disabling condition. A situation results in which the profit motive 
drives insurers in many cases to actively avoid persons with disabilities as 
customers . . . .”); see also Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 27–29 (explaining the 
effect of preexisting condition exclusions and annual and lifetime caps on pri-
vate insurance coverage for people with disabilities). This irony is central to 
many of Deborah Stone’s critiques of the American health-insurance system. 
See, e.g., Stone, supra note 24, at 308 (“The logic and methods of actuarial 
fairness mean denying insurance to those who most need medical care. The 
principle actually distributes medical care in inverse relation to need, and to 
the large extent that commercial insurers operate on this principle, the Ameri-
can reliance on the private sector as its main provider of health insurance es-
tablishes a system that is perfectly and perversely designed to keep sick peo-
ple away from doctors.”); see also Deborah Stone, Protect the Sick: Health 
Insurance Reform in One Easy Lesson, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 652 (2008). 
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both state and the federal legislators attempted to limit some of 
these exclusionary practices by restricting pre-existing condi-
tion exclusions32 or through guaranteed issue laws.33 Yet de-
spite these efforts, many individuals with disabilities continued 
to be ineligible for private insurance and those that did qualify 
paid substantial premiums for their policies.34 Thus, individu-
als with disabilities not covered by Medicare or Medicaid fre-
quently found themselves uninsured.35
c. Public Health and Disability 
 
Finally, laws designed to promote public health also deal 
with issues related to disability. Public health is “what we as a 
society, do collectively to assure the conditions in which people 
can be healthy.”36
 
 32. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE MARKET REFORMS: PRE-EXISTING CONDITION EXCLUSIONS (Sept. 2012) 
(describing the pre-ACA regulation of pre-existing condition exclusions by 
state and federal laws and the impact of health-care reform on that regula-
tion). 
 In the United States, public health has re-
 33. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE MARKET REFORMS: GUARANTEED ISSUE (June 2012) (“In most states, in-
surers are not required to guarantee issue policies to individuals. However, 
under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) of 1996, some insurance companies are required to guarantee issue 
policies to certain individuals, referred to as HIPAA-eligible individuals, re-
gardless of their health status and disability.”). As of June 2012, only six 
states guaranteed issue of all products to all of their residents. Id. 
 34. See supra notes 21–33 and accompanying text. 
 35. RHODA OLKIN, WHAT PSYCHOTHERAPISTS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DIS-
ABILITY 18 (1999) (“Disability status is associated with certain patterns of 
health insurance. Persons with disabilities are less likely to be covered by pri-
vate health insurance than the nondisabled. Those with severe disabilities are 
more likely to be covered by government (vs. private) insurance than are peo-
ple with no or mild disabilities, and persons with mild disabilities are the most 
likely to be uninsured (36%). This latter group might be analogous to those 
referred to as the working poor—too much income to qualify for aid and too 
little income to be sufficient for needs, particularly given increased costs of liv-
ing with a disability.”). While the above summary describes the historical 
practices of the private, for-profit health-insurance industry, several of the 
conventions described above will soon become a thing of the past. Many of the 
provisions of the ACA discussed in Part III attempt to dismantle this histori-
cally disadvantageous system. See infra Part III.B. Moreover, although Con-
gress clearly intended to eliminate some of the disadvantages produced by the 
existing insurance structure when crafting the ACA, I have my reservations 
regarding the effectiveness of those provisions. See generally Roberts, supra 
note 18 (contending that the ACA protections will ultimately fail to eliminate 
the disparities). 
 36. Barry S. Levy, Twenty-First Century Challenges for Law and Public 
Health, 32 IND. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1999) (quoting a 1988 report from the In-
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sulted in significant increases in overall life expectancy for 
Americans.37 Public health law has many branches, such as en-
vironmental law, disease tracking and reporting standards, and 
statutes mandating involuntary testing and treatment.38
Consequently, people with disabilities occupy a rather 
unique role with respect to public health, a role that might ex-
plain why they have been markedly absent from most health 
disparities research.
 Public 
health law, therefore, seeks to promote health at the communi-
ty level, usually by preventing members of a population from 
getting sick or injured in the first place. 
39 As mentioned, reducing the incidence of 
disease and injury in a given population constitutes a central 
objective of the public health project. Individuals with disabili-
ties often acquire their impairments through disease and inju-
ry.40 Hence, the goal of public health—as it relates to individu-
als with disabilities—has historically been to prevent them 
from existing in the first place.41
 
stitute of Medicine). 
 Instead of construing people 
with disabilities as members of the served population, public 
health law has instead treated them as the very problems pub-
lic health policies seek to solve. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1150–52 (explaining the eight areas of public health law out-
lined in F. DOUGLAS SCUTCHFIELD & C. WILLIAM KECK, PRINCIPLES OF PUB-
LIC HEALTH PRACTICE (1997)). Those areas are: (1) environmental health laws; 
(2) laws and regulations on reporting disease and injury; (3) laws pertaining to 
vital statistics; (4) disease and injury control; (5) involuntary testing; (6) con-
tact tracing; (7) immunization and mandatory treatment; and (8) personal re-
strictions. Id. 
 39. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 12 (describing 
the “dissonance” between “the longstanding public health goal of eliminating 
disability and disease and the emerging view . . . defin[ing] disability as a de-
mographic characteristic”). 
 40. Harlan Hahn has quipped, “Violence is how people with disabilities 
reproduce.” Professor Harlan Hahn, Univ. of S. Cal., Lecture to Stigma in So-
ciety Class (Fall 2001).  
 41. In fact, a 1991 report from the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on a 
National Agenda for the Prevention of Disabilities (perhaps the committee 
name already says it all), makes its primary goal preventing potentially disa-
bling conditions from developing into disabilities and explains that “[d]espite 
an officially stated national goal of independence and equality of opportunity 
for people with disabilities, current approaches to preventing disability and 
improving the lives of people with disabling conditions lack conceptual clarity 
and unity of purpose.” INST. OF MEDICINE, DISABILITY IN AMERICA: TOWARD A 
NATIONAL AGENDA FOR PREVENTION 4 (Andrew M. Pope & Alvin R. Tarlov 
eds., 1991).  
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People with disabilities have a complex relationship with 
health law. While programs such as Medicaid and Medicare 
provide them with access to government benefits, the laws and 
regulations governing private insurance and public health clas-
sify them as at-risk individuals who represent either high po-
tential payouts that may be too costly to insure, or as an unde-
sirable population demographic that should be eliminated. 
Thus, several kinds of “health law” directly affect individuals 
with disabilities. 
2. Civil Rights Law and Disability 
In the context of this Article, “civil rights law” means laws 
designed to elevate the social standing of a historically disad-
vantaged group.42 Therefore, the underlying purpose of civil 
rights legislation is to eradicate group subordination. Civil 
rights statutes prohibit covered entities from discriminating on 
the basis of a protected trait.43 As part of their antidiscrimina-
tion mandate, they may also require positive differential 
treatment, such as the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provi-
sion.44
The Rehabilitation Act, passed in 1973, requires that enti-
ties receiving federal funds provide equal access to their pro-
grams and services for people with disabilities.
 The two most prominent civil rights laws for people with 
disabilities are the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 
45
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United 
States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded 
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-
 Its most fa-
mous provision, Section 504, states that  
 
 42. This definition of civil rights law undeniably embraces 
antisubordination. However, given the common understanding of a “civil 
rights movement” as an effort to promote the equal social standing of a histor-
ically disadvantaged group, I find linking the concept to group subordination 
here sensible. 
 43. I have in the past described an “antidiscrimination paradigm” to con-
note framing an issue as a matter of untenable discrimination, see Roberts, 
supra note 18, at 1163, or to describe particular kinds of legal protections, 
mainly antisubordination or anticlassification, see Jessica L. Roberts, The Ge-
netic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination Law, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 630–34 (2011). 
 44. Significantly, the ADA definition of to “discriminate” includes “not 
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limita-
tions of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006). 
 45. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (1998). 
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nancial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any 
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.46
The Rehabilitation Act constituted landmark legislation at the 
time because it—perhaps accidentally—framed the disad-
vantages and exclusion faced by people with disabilities as “dis-
crimination” and therefore a matter of civil rights.
 
47 By adopt-
ing an antidiscrimination frame, the law provided a catalyst for 
the American disability rights movement.48
Almost twenty years later, President George H.W. Bush 
signed the ADA into law. The ADA contains four substantive 
titles,
 
49 which prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability 
in employment,50 local and state government services,51 public 
accommodations,52 and telecommunications.53 People with disa-
bilities, along with their family members and friends, mobilized 
to push Congress to pass the ADA, forming what one scholar 
famously called a “hidden army” for civil rights.54 However, the 
story does not end there. Following a series of restrictive court 
interpretations of the ADA, Congress passed the Americans 
with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008, in an at-
tempt to restore the statute to its original state.55
 
 46. Id. § 794(a). 
  
 47. See RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DIS-
ABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 123 (2001) (stating that “few foresaw . . . 
that Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] . . . would provide the basis for the 
disability rights revolution”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Title V of the ADA includes miscellaneous technical provisions. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12201–12213. 
 50. Id. §§ 12111–12117. 
 51. Id. §§ 12131–12165. 
 52. Id. §§ 12181–12189. 
 53. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (amending the Communications Act of 1934). 
 54. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A 
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 117 (1993). 
 55. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The ADAAA expressly rejected the Supreme Court’s 
limited interpretation of disability under the ADA in Sutton and Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing. Congress found that “the holdings of the Supreme Court in 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases 
have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the 
ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress in-
tended to protect,” id. § 2(a)(4), and that “the holding of the Supreme Court in 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) 
further narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the 
ADA,” id. § 2(a)(5). 
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As mentioned, the health law paradigm predates the civil 
rights paradigm.56 Disability rights activists, therefore, made a 
strategic choice to adopt an alternate legislative paradigm.57 
Their decision to move away from health law toward civil rights 
law had its roots in the goals of the disability rights move-
ment.58 Thus, following the disability rights movement of the 
1970s and 1980s, two concurrent, yet mutually exclusive59
B. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SCHISM 
 
kinds of legislation applied to people with disabilities: (1) 
health laws governing issues related to health-care access and 
wellness and (2) civil rights laws prohibiting covered entities 
from discriminating on the basis of disability. 
Explanations for the schism between the health and civil 
rights paradigms in disability law exist on both sides of the di-
vide. Perhaps, health law- and policy-makers believed that the-
se two concepts existed in tension, adopting the perspective 
that “disability” constitutes the absence—or juxtapositional op-
posite—of “health.” Simultaneously, the disability rights 
movement actively adopted the social model of disability, lead-
ing advocates to demedicalize disability and to reject the pater-
nalism of the social welfare system. 
1. Health Law Explanations 
Health law (specifically social benefits, insurance, and pub-
lic health law) tends to define disability in largely medical 
terms. Consequently, those laws do not characterize people 
with disabilities as a social group entitled to civil rights. 
The concepts of “health” and “disability” have a complicat-
ed, long-standing relationship. Health is an elusive concept 
with no single universally accepted definition. As a result, bio-
ethical philosophers have written extensively on the meaning of 
“health.” The two dominant theories in this area, naturalism 
and normativism, illuminate why health and disability may 
appear to be mutually exclusive categories, thereby explaining 
 
 56. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 5 (explaining that advocates of disabil-
ity rights viewed antidiscrimination laws as an alternative to civil rights 
laws). 
 58. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 59. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 19 (explaining that the ADA made no 
changes to the existing social benefits program). 
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the frequently complicated relationship between these catego-
ries within the law. 
Naturalism, the most widely accepted philosophical ap-
proach, grounds itself in scientific theory.60 Naturalists main-
tain that health exists when an organism is functioning at a 
normal, biologically natural level.61
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform func-
tional design; specifically, an age group or a sex of a species. 
 Christopher Boorse, author 
of one of the most popular naturalist definitions, presents his 
construction of health as a four-part syllogism, which relies 
both on the concept of normalcy and the idea of disease as a de-
parture from that state: 
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of the refer-
ence class is a statistically typical contribution by it to their individu-
al survival and reproduction . . . . 
3. A disease is a type of internal state which is either an impairment 
of normal functional ability, i.e., a reduction of one or more functional 
abilities below typical efficiency, or a limitation on functional ability 
caused by the environment. 
4. Health is the absence of disease.62
Boorse, therefore, defines health in the negative. Health occurs 
where disease is absent. Boorse uses the term “disease” to sig-
nify “an impairment of normal functional ability,” a definition 
that parallels many of the accepted definitions of “disability.”
 
63 
Without the concept of a “normal” or healthy body, there is no 
such thing as an “abnormal” or disabled body.64
 
 60. Marc Ereshefsky, Defining ‘Health’ and ‘Disease,’ 40 STUD. HIST. & 
PHIL. BIOLOGICAL & BIOMEDICAL SCI. 221, 221 (2009). 
 In fact, the very 
thing that unites individuals with varying types and degrees of 
impairment as members of the group “people with disabilities” 
is their shared departure from the accepted norm. In making 
“normal” functioning its touchstone, the naturalist approach 
puts health and disability in opposition with each other, mak-
ing them incompatible categories. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 222 (quoting Christopher Boorse, A Rebuttal on Health, in 
WHAT IS DISEASE? 1, 7–8 (James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 
1997)). 
 63. All three legal definitions of disability discussed in Part I.C. include 
some reference to an impairment that limits functioning.  
 64. See Lennard J. Davis, Constructing Normalcy, in THE DISABILITY 
STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 3 (“To understand the disabled body, one 
must return to the concept of the norm, the normal body . . . . I do this because 
the ‘problem’ is not the person with disabilities; the problem is the way that 
normalcy is constructed to create the ‘problem’ of the disabled person.”). 
  
2013] DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW 1979 
 
Normativism presents an alternative to naturalism. The 
normativist approach defines health as a socially valued state, 
while disease represents a socially undesirable state.65 This def-
inition may likewise position disability at odds with health. So-
ciety has historically devalued people with disabilities. Having 
a disability has—in the past—led to the denial of several basic 
civil liberties, including the right to vote, the right to marry, 
and the right to procreate, among others.66 Society has not 
treated people with disabilities as full persons. Moreover, be-
cause disability is considered an undesirable state, govern-
ments and institutions devote significant resources to the treat-
ing, preventing, or curing of potentially disabling conditions.67 
Therefore, like in naturalism, the concepts of “health” and “dis-
ability” may also exist in tension within normativism, depend-
ing on how society values certain traits.68
Even if health and disability are not characterized as per-
fectly opposed to one another, they still maintain some degree 
of inverse relation. As the seriousness of an individual’s disabil-
ity increases, she can expect her level of health to decrease; 
likewise, as an individual’s health declines, her likelihood of 
manifesting a disabling impairment increases.
 
69 Thus, while 
“health” and “disability” are not always understood as 
juxtapositional opposites they are nonetheless related concep-
tually, making it challenging to define one without at least 
some reference to the other.70
 
 65. Ereshefsky, supra note 
 
60, at 221. 
 66. Robert Funk, Disability Rights: From Caste to Class in the Context of 
Civil Rights, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 7, 7–8 (Alan 
Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987) (explaining that people with disabilities consti-
tute “a minority group who [has] been denied basic civil liberties such as the 
right to vote, to marry and bear children, to attend school, and to obtain em-
ployment”). 
 67. Contrary to this sentiment, many individuals with disabilities would 
not seek a cure of their underlying conditions were it available. See Harlan D. 
Hahn & Todd L. Belt, Disability Identity and Attitudes Toward Cure in a 
Sample of Disabled Activists, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 453 (2004). 
 68. It is important to note that in some cultural and historical contexts, 
people with disabilities are revered. See CAROLYN L. VASH & NANCY M. 
CREWE, PSYCHOLOGY OF DISABILITY 31 (2d ed. 2003). 
 69. One disability scholar has explained the relationship between health 
and disability as follows: “[T]hink of two continua, one denoting health and the 
other disability. The two continua are not parallel but get closer as severity 
increases on each one; that is, the two concepts of health and disability are re-
lated, but they are neither completely coincidental nor orthogonal.” OLKIN, su-
pra note 35, at 9–10. 
 70. Id. (“It is possible to have a disability—for example, [cerebral palsy]—
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Given the frequently oppositional relationship between 
health and disability, it stands to reason that legislation in-
tended to promote “health” would likewise seek to cabin “disa-
bility,” as in the context of public health.71 Further, social bene-
fits law provides resources to those in need. Thus—as a variety 
of health law—social welfare legislation construes people with 
disabilities as objects of charity or members of the deserving 
poor.72
Finally, as discussed, the law of health insurance deals 
primarily with industry regulation. For-profit health insurers 
generate revenue by investing in “good risks” with limited ex-
penses, making accurate risk assessment essential to this sys-
tem. Hence, the historically predominant approach to American 
private health insurance has been one of actuarial fairness.
 With the seeming conflict between “health” and “disabil-
ity” it is not surprising that health and civil rights protections 
have remained discrete areas of disability law. 
73
Whereas actuarial fairness promotes a norm of personal 
responsibility, the solidarity principle advocates mutual aid.
 
The central tenet of actuarial fairness is that individuals 
should be responsible for their own needs, thereby making 
widespread risk pooling in health insurance undesirable as the 
healthy will inevitably bear the costs of the sick. Conversely, 
the solidarity principle maintains that risk-pooling is desirable 
to ensure that those who are in need of care can receive it. 
74
 
and also to be in excellent health. However, more serious disabilities often 
compromise an individual’s health. . . . [T]he overlap between disability and 
illness becomes increasingly important as the conditions on either or both in-
crease in severity. It is probably not possible to come up with a definition of 
disability that includes only disability and not illness, and vice versa.”); see 
also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 
 
Although public benefits programs like Medicare and Medicaid 
may intervene to help those deemed deserving, for most of 
American history the health insurance industry and its govern-
ing laws have preferred an individualized account of fairness 
that favors “healthy” people over those with ongoing health-
28, at 127 (explaining that “a 
disability is often incorrectly assumed to determine a person’s general health 
status”). 
 71. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 72. The disability rights movement would reject these constructions of 
disability as unduly paternalistic. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying 
text. 
 73. See Stone, supra note 24, at 290 (arguing that actuarial fairness is 
“deeply embedded in the structure of competitive markets in insurance”). 
 74. See id. at 290–94. 
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care needs.75 With the health insurance industry’s desire to as-
sess risk accurately and the relevance of disability to those in-
quiries, separating health law from civil rights law keeps the 
actuarial fairness model intact.76
To sum up, the relevant areas of health-law regulation do 
not construct “disability” as a civil rights issue. While social-
benefits law treats people with disabilities as objects of charity, 
public health law views them as problems to be solved. Alt-
hough not explicitly dealing with disability, health insurance 
regulation has traditionally permitted insurers to differentiate 
between good and bad health risks. Thus, all three areas of 
health law frame disability in more or less medical terms. Be-
cause civil rights law protects individuals based on their social 
standing, the construction of disability as a medical issue with-
in health law has contributed to the schism in the protections 
available to people with disabilities. 
 
2. Civil Rights Law Explanations 
Health laws dealing with disability came well before the 
civil rights legislation of the 1970s and beyond. Consequently, 
in promoting a civil rights model, members of the disability 
rights movement actively chose to move away from the existing 
legal paradigm. This choice of legislative framework was essen-
 
 75. See id. at 308 (“The logic and methods of actuarial fairness mean 
denying insurance to those who most need medical care. The principle actually 
distributes medical care in inverse relation to need, and to the large extent 
that commercial insurers operate on this principle, the American reliance on 
the private sector as its main provider of health insurance establishes a sys-
tem that is perfectly and perversely designed to keep sick people away from 
doctors.”). 
 76. As discussed below, the ADA contains a “safe harbor” provision for in-
surance. See infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. Whether such an ex-
emption is desirable, however, depends upon the model of health insurance 
one adopts: actuarial fairness or solidarity. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Impact of 
the ADA on the Health Care System, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 175, 182 
(Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) (“The ADA’s exemption of 
underwriting is reasonable if the industry is regarded strictly as a business. It 
is difficult to question the right of the insurance industry to discriminate on 
the basis of sound actuarial data. The very essence of underwriting is to classi-
fy people according to risk, treating those with higher risks differently. How-
ever, if health insurers are viewed as an integral part of health care policy, the 
ADA’s exemption of underwriting becomes worrisome. The social purpose of 
health insurance is to spread risk across groups, enabling wider access to 
health care services. If health benefits become unavailable or unaffordable to 
those who are most likely to become ill, the social purpose of health coverage is 
thwarted.”). 
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tial to their cause. As Justin Dart, a prominent activist popu-
larly known as the father of the ADA, explained: “Around 1980 
it became clear to me that we would never overcome the barri-
ers to mainstream participation until the message of our full 
humanity was communicated in the consciousness and political 
process of America by a strong, highly visible, comprehensive 
civil rights law.”77
Moreover, for many of the disability rights advocates of the 
late twentieth century, adopting the civil rights law paradigm 
meant simultaneously renouncing the health law paradigm.
  
78
As explained, health law construes disability as a medical 
category. The disability rights movement, however, adopted a 
different position, known as the “social model” of disability. The 
social model recasts “disability” from a functional limitation to 
a limitation imposed by the interaction between a person’s im-
pairment and her physical and social environment.
 
This “either-or” mentality resulted from a number of character-
istics associated with health law. 
79 Once dis-
ability is understood as a social problem, the focus shifts from 
the individual body of the person with a disability to the struc-
tural shortcomings of the society at large.80 The social model 
gives way to the civil rights model: construing disability as a 
social category lays the foundation for understanding people 
with disabilities as a minority group that has experienced dis-
crimination and oppression.81
 
 77. JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISA-
BILITY POLICY AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 91 (2003) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Justin W. Dart, Jr., Introduction: The ADA: A Promise to Be Kept, in 
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RE-
SPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS xxii (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer 
eds., 1993)). 
 By advocating the social model of 
 78. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 18 (“[I]n the campaign to enact the 
ADA, disability rights activists frequently posed a stark choice between wel-
fare and civil rights approaches.”). 
 79. Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 
85 (2007) (“The social model of disability asserts that contingent social condi-
tions rather than inherent biological limitations constrain individuals’ abilities 
and create a disability category.”). See generally Tom Shakespeare, The Social 
Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 266–
72 (explaining the application of the social model theory in Britain). 
 80. See Shakespeare, supra note 79, at 268 (“Impairment is distinguished 
from disability. The former is individual and private, the latter is structural 
and public.”). 
 81. Harlan Hahn equates people with disabilities to “other oppressed 
groups” distinguished from the majority by a particular trait, citing such 
common experiences as segregation and severe poverty. Harlan Hahn, Adver-
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disability, those activists reframed the historical exclusion of 
people with disabilities from the result of functional limitations 
to an issue of civil rights. 
Part of demedicalizing disability involves rejecting the tra-
ditional connotations of normalcy that are so essential to the 
naturalist understanding of health.82
There is nothing a health care provider can do that will make us 
‘normal.’ The problem is not the use of a wheelchair, but the concept 
of what is normal. People who use wheelchairs are quite normal. We 
are different, but normal. We have a right to be different and a right 
to be treated equally.
 Proponents of disability 
rights, therefore, used the language of equality to attack what 
it means to be normal. As one disability scholar and advocate 
opined: 
83
By rejecting the medical model of disability and the underlying 
notion of statistical normalcy as desirable, disability rights ac-
tivists moved away from the traditional goals of treatment and 
cure. Under the social framework, the solution to their histori-
cal oppression and exclusion lay not in medical science but in 
civil rights. 
 
Another related ideological move within the disability 
rights movement was the rejection of paternalistic attitudes 
toward people with disabilities.84
 
tising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disability and Capitalism, 15 POL’Y 
STUD. J. 551, 553 (1987); see also OLKIN, supra note 
 The medical model construed 
35, at 36 (explaining the 
“disability experience” as one that involves the “prejudice, stigma, and dis-
crimination which is common to all minority groups”). But see SHAPIRO, supra 
note 54, at 126 (“The disability rights movement spanned a splintered uni-
verse. There are hundreds of different disabilities, and each group tended to 
see its issues in relation to its specific disability.”); SWITZER, supra note 77, at 
70 (“There is some disagreement about whether disabled persons fit into the 
social movement typology because they do not represent a minority group in 
the traditional sense of the word and therefore should not be regarded in the 
sense of a class of individuals. Nor are they sufficiently united in their dis-
crimination.”). More recently, some disability scholars have challenged the 
framing of people with disabilities as an oppressed minority as inconsistent 
with the other goals of the disability rights movement. See Andrew I. Batavia, 
The New Paternalism: Portraying People with Disabilities as an Oppressed 
Minority, 12 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 107, 112 (2001) (“Characterizing the 
population of people with disabilities as an oppressed minority . . . is a strate-
gy destined to sustain people with disabilities in a state of subsistence.”). 
 82. See generally Davis, supra note 64 (explaining the relatively new ori-
gins of the current meaning of the word “normal” and the framing of the “av-
erage” as the “ideal” in medical science). 
 83. SWITZER, supra note 77, at 7–8 (quoting David Pfeiffer). 
 84. Batavia, supra note 81, at 112 (explaining that the disability rights 
movement “specifically rejected the paternalism of the medical model of disa-
bility, which characterized people with disabilities as dependent patients who 
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people with disabilities as dependents in need of assistance and 
care. Frequently, individuals with disabilities were not active 
participants in the decisions regarding their own treatment, 
medical and otherwise.85 Thus, the disability rights movement 
sought to free people with disabilities from the oppressive (yet 
arguably well-meaning) hold of family, friends, and social insti-
tutions.86
At the time of the early disability rights movement, its 
staunch rejection of both the medical model and the historically 
paternalistic attitudes toward people with disabilities made 
health law a wholly undesirable tool for pursuing the goals of 
access, independence, and integration. 
 
To start, both health insurance regulation and public 
health law contain strong medical components. Health insur-
ance law governs a market that provides insureds with access 
to medical care. However, the removal of structural barriers—
both physical and attitudinal—was at the heart of the disabil-
ity rights movement. Thus, not only was insurance law ill-
equipped to achieve the movement’s primary objectives, but 
even attempting to reform the health insurance system to im-
prove coverage for people with disabilities could reify the con-
struction of disability as a medical state. 
Similarly, public health law frames its goals in medical 
terms. As noted, the historical position of public health has 
been that disability is something to be reduced and eventually 
eliminated. Employing a legislative paradigm that seeks to 
eradicate the very existence of people with disabilities seems 
counterintuitive to a movement designed to promote their 
equality and full citizenship. Further, it would not be surpris-
ing if members of the disability rights movement had signifi-
cant reticence with respect to public health legislation. One of 
the most shameful public health initiatives in American histo-
ry—the eugenics movement of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries—targeted people with disabilities.87
 
must be cared for by the medical establishment and who were often cared for 
in a manner that did not satisfy their interests”). 
 
 85. See id. 
 86. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 7 (“One overarching goal is a negative one: 
freedom from the control of paternalistic parents, professionals, institutions, 
and welfare bureaucracies.”). 
 87. During this time states enacted laws to sterilize the “feeble-minded.” 
See SWITZER, supra note 77, at 36–38. Probably the most famous state-
sanctioned sterilization was that of Carrie Buck, the subject of the still-
infamous holding in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). These forced steriliza-
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Moreover, social benefits law was a similarly unappealing 
tool. The disability rights movement by and large rejected the 
social welfare system as unduly oppressive and paternalistic.88 
Advocates critiqued the programs on at least three different, 
yet related, grounds. Some believed that the benefits them-
selves represented an effort to pay off a potentially bothersome 
group.89 Others maintained that disability-specific benefits 
promoted a culture of dependence and a “welfare mentality” 
that ran counter to the goal of independent living.90 Finally, 
certain members of the disability rights movement believed 
that the beneficence of the social welfare programs simply 
masked a deep-seated discomfort regarding people with disabil-
ities.91 Civil rights law, therefore, presented an attractive al-
ternative: people with disabilities could achieve independence 
through civil rights and no longer need the paternalistic bene-
fits provided by social welfare.92
Thus, the conceptual dissonance between traditional con-
notations of “health” and “disability,” the reframing of disabil-
ity as a social—not medical—category, and the rejection of pa-
ternalism led advocates of disability rights initially to keep 
health and civil rights protections distinct. 
 
 
tions carried on well into the latter half of the twentieth century, with indi-
viduals sterilized against their wills continuing to come forward today. See, 
e.g., Kim Severson, Thousands Sterilized, a State Weighs Restitution, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at A1. 
 88. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 5 (“Much of the thinking of the disability 
rights movement in this country developed as a reaction to the perceived pa-
ternalism and oppression that attended a welfare-based response to disabil-
ity.”). Samuel Bagenstos has written prolifically on this topic. 
 89. Id. at 15. 
 90. Id. at 15–16. 
 91. Id. at 16–17; see also Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and So-
cial Research on Disability: The Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & 
L. 41, 43 (1996) (arguing that superficial sympathy and pity “has perpetuated 
the segregation and inequality of [disabled persons’] segment in society”). 
 92. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 5 (“By the 1970s, many disability 
rights advocates were presenting antidiscrimination laws as an alternative to 
social welfare provision for people with disabilities—a tool that would obviate 
welfare programs by giving people with disabilities opportunities to make a 
living on their own.”); id. at 10 (“[M]any disability rights activists sought to 
change the social welfare orientation of disability law. Those activists argued 
that welfare is oppressive and stifling and that antidiscrimination and ac-
commodation requirements would enable people with disabilities to leave the 
benefits rolls and enter the workforce.”). 
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C. IMPLICATIONS 
Separating the health and civil rights models affects the 
kind of legal protections available to people with disabilities. 
The way in which the ADA—a civil rights statute—deals with 
employer-provided health insurance—an area governed by 
health law—exemplifies how “health law” and “civil rights” law 
operate separately in the context of disability. The ADA in-
cludes a so-called “safe harbor” provision, which provides that 
health insurance providers may engage in risk assessment 
practices for underwriting and rating purposes,93 so long as 
those practices do not constitute “subterfuge” to evade the stat-
ute’s purpose.94 While Congress’s intent in drafting this provi-
sion is not entirely clear,95 including a health-insurance safe 
harbor at a minimum indicates a desire to leave traditional in-
surance practices intact.96
 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1) (2006) (“Subchapters I through III of this chap-
ter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict—(1) an 
insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organiza-
tion, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organi-
zations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks 
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or (2) a person or organi-
zation covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, or observing or 
administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on under-
writing risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on 
or not inconsistent with State law; or (3) a person or organization covered by 
this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, or observing or administering the 
terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate 
insurance.”). 
 Arguably, Congress did not want a 
federal civil rights statute intruding into the area of primarily 
state-governed health law regulation. 
 94. Id. (“Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to 
evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter.”). 
 95. See Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 78 (noting that “[t]he 
meaning and application of Section 501(c) have been the source of much confu-
sion and the subject of much litigation”); see also Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 
38 (describing the provision as “nearly inscrutable”). 
 96. See Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 85 (“[T]he legislative 
history of the ADA contains some indication that Congress did indeed include 
the safe harbor in order to make perfectly clear that the ADA would not re-
quire insurance companies to change how they conducted their underwriting 
or risk classification practices.”); Crossley, Discrimination Against the Un-
healthy, supra note 18, at 95 (“Congress’s inclusion of the insurance safe har-
bor reflected a conscious decision not to disrupt traditional underwriting prac-
tices by insurers.”); see also Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability: 
The Challenges of the ADA, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 331, 340 (1990) 
(stating that, because of the safe harbor provision, the ADA “cannot be read as 
a mandated insurance law”).  
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Further, quite tellingly, the law cannot decide on a unified 
way of defining disability. Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation 
Act employ a definition of disability that includes social ele-
ments. They define “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”97
Part of the social model’s contribution to disability theory 
was distinguishing the shared social experience of disability 
from a given individual’s functional ability.
 
Although impairment-based, this definition—especially the 
“regarded as” provision—still communicates an understanding 
of disability as social category. To begin, the definition sepa-
rates the “disability” (social condition) from the “impairment” 
(medical condition). 
98
The civil rights law definition of disability, found in the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, reflects this distinction. It 
separates “impairment” from “disability,”
 For example, a 
person who uses a wheelchair may have a mobility impairment, 
such as difficulty walking. However, she may not experience 
that condition as disabling until she attempts to enter a build-
ing with a stairwell or a narrow doorway. Thus, the impair-
ment—difficulty walking—is distinct from the disability—a 
lack of access. 
99 indicating they are 
not one and the same. Pursuant to the definition, an impair-
ment only becomes disabling when it leads to some kind of tan-
gible restriction on a person’s ability to function in her envi-
ronment, in the form of a substantial limitation on a major life 
activity.100 Furthermore, including individuals “regarded as” 
disabled indicates that a person may experience disability—
such as exclusion, disadvantage, or a lack of access—even ab-
sent a substantially limiting impairment.101
 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. V 2011). The Rehabilitation Act defines 
disability almost identically. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (2006). 
 The “regarded as” 
prong eliminates the need to establish an underlying medical 
 98. See MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGI-
CAL APPROACH 12–24 (1990) (arguing that both impairment and disability are 
socially constructed). 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Similarly, the “record of” provision indicates that a person may con-
tinue to experience disability, even after the impairment no longer substan-
tially limits her. 
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condition.102 That is not to say the civil rights law definition is 
completely social in nature. While containing aspects of the so-
cial model, scholars have criticized both the disabil-
ity/impairment binary generally and the ADA definition specif-
ically for ultimately relying too heavily on a medicalized 
understanding of disability.103
On the contrary, the social welfare definition of disability 
relies more heavily on functional limitation, as well as an ina-
bility to perform wage work.
 
104 The Social Security Act defines 
disability as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous pe-
riod of not less than 12 months.”105 The definition has a strong 
diagnostic feel: the impairment must be “medically determina-
ble” and carrying a poor prognosis—at least a year of duration 
or resulting in death. Moreover, predicating benefits on a 
medicalized understanding of disability means that, improve-
ments in functioning may lead to an individual’s benefits being 
terminated.106
 
 102. Perhaps because the “regarded as” definition of disability does not re-
quire the existence of an underlying impairment, Congress eliminated the 
availability of reasonable accommodation for claims brought under solely un-
der that prong. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h). 
 Thus, individuals with temporary or episodic 
conditions who qualify for support may choose not to reenter 
 103. Brad Areheart takes on the binary both conceptually and as applied. 
Bradley A. Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2011); 
see also Ramona L. Paetzold, Why Incorporate Disability Studies into Teaching 
Discrimination Law?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 61, 74–76 (2010) (explaining 
the philosophical shortcomings of both the social model, with its distinction 
between impairment and disability, and the ADA). 
 104. Social welfare and civil rights law defined disability differently. Possi-
bly because of the redistributive aim of the benefits programs, the civil rights 
definition of disability is more expansive than its social welfare counterpart. 
See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 295 (“Unlike civil rights 
approaches, benefits statutes seek to provide material resources to address 
disability discrimination. They are social welfare statutes and are intended to 
be redistributive in nature. Social welfare statutes restrict disability status to 
limit expenditures rather than to limit protected class status to those with a 
history of oppression. Perhaps as a result, the definition of disability is more 
restrictive under benefits statutes than under civil rights statutes.”).  
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 106. Samuel Bagenstos has noted the fear of losing benefits to be of sub-
stantial concern for people with disabilities. Consequently, even in light of 
medical improvement, beneficiaries may remain out of the labor force. 
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 32–34 (describing how the current structure of the 
public health insurance system creates a psychological investment in unem-
ployment). 
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the workforce out of the fear that should their condition return 
they would no longer be eligible.107
Public health and insurance law also adopt medical, func-
tional definitions of disability. For example, the Dictionary of 
Public Health defines disability as the “[r]educed capacity of a 
person to perform usual functions, usually the consequence of 
an impairment, such as impaired mobility or intellectual im-
pairment.”
  
108 Likewise, the Dictionary of Health Insurance and 
Managed Care adopts a definition very similar to the social 
welfare iteration, explaining that a disability is “[a] physical or 
mental impairment caused by accident or illness that partially 
or totally limits one’s ability to perform duties of his or her own 
occupation or any occupation for which the individual is rea-
sonably suited by education, training, or experience.”109 (Im-
portantly, the definition of disability may also vary pursuant to 
individual policies and programs.110
The differing legislative paradigms associated with disabil-
ity law have led to confusion regarding the legal meaning of 
“disability,” as well as who qualifies as “a person with a disabil-
ity.”
) Thus, while sometimes 
distinguishing disability from impairment, health law defini-
tions are more medical in nature and place greater weight on 
the existence and effect of the underlying impairment than the 
civil rights definitions. 
111
Summing up, protections for people with disabilities have 
historically been split between two substantive legal para-
digms: health law and civil rights law. That rift stems at least 
in part from how we understand disability: a predominantly 
medical conceptualization favors the health law paradigm, 
 As demonstrated in the following Part, the separation 
between health and civil rights law has led to shortcomings in 
the legal protections available to people with disabilities, par-
ticularly with respect to gaining meaningful access to health 
care. 
 
 107. See id. 
 108. A DICTIONARY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 94 (John M. Last ed., 2007). But see 
J.E. SCHMIDT, 2 ATTORNEY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE & WORD FINDER D-157 
(2011) (adopting the first prong of the ADA’s definition of “disability”). 
 109. DICTIONARY OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE 88 (David 
Edward Marcinko ed., 2006). 
 110. Id. (“In life and health insurance policies or government benefit pro-
grams, definitions of disability may vary.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 
797 (1999) (holding that the “pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not 
automatically estop the recipient from pursuing an ADA claim”). 
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whereas a predominantly social conceptualization favors the 
civil rights paradigm. While the civil rights statutes described 
above facially apply to various kinds of health-care providers, 
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA have failed to facilitate 
equality, access, and integration for people with disabilities in 
the context of health care. 
II.  HEALTH-CARE ACCESS FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES   
While advocates of disability rights construe discrimina-
tion based on disability as a social—not medical—problem, 
health-care access presents unique challenges for individuals 
with disabilities. This Part examines the pervasive inequalities 
experienced by people with disabilities with respect to health 
care and the failure of the civil rights laws, specifically the 
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, to address these notable 
shortcomings. 
A. HEALTH DISPARITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 
Although some disability scholars maintain that “illness” is 
not in and of itself a disability rights issue,112
 
 112. See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 
 people with disa-
5, at 300 (citing Satz, 
Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, supra note 5, 
at 561–67). Satz makes this distinction because while “disability” and “illness” 
may overlap, they are not identical categories. Id. at 300–01 (“Individuals who 
are sick may not be disabled, and vice-versa. Further, access to adequate 
health care, in terms of both coverage and the range of medical services avail-
able, is a problem for individuals with and without disabilities. While disabil-
ity may seem to raise some complicating factors—including a possible higher 
consumption of health care resources than most individuals, health care ra-
tioning schemes that disfavor those with medical impairments, and difficulty 
moving between public assistance programs that include health care and the 
workforce—these are problems that individuals without disabilities face as 
well.”); see also Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimi-
nation, supra note 5, at 561 (“First and foremost, disability does not equate 
with illness. The population of individuals who are ill or medically fragile ex-
ceeds the disability class. Illness may give rise to disability, but it does not 
presuppose it.”). Instead, she views illness as universalizing principle that 
demonstrates our shared vulnerability. Id. at 552 (“Illness is perhaps the 
prime example of a universal and constant vulnerability. When manifest, it 
significantly heightens other vulnerabilities for disabled and nondisabled peo-
ple alike; it is not a disability issue.”). In my previous scholarship, I myself 
have distinguished between the concepts of “healthism” (discrimination on the 
basis of health status) and “ableism” (discrimination on the basis of 
(dis)ability). See Roberts, supra note 18, at 1171 n.68 (differentiating 
healthism and ableism). However, simply because some of the challenges faced 
by people with disabilities also affect individuals outside the disability com-
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bilities have on-going health-care needs related to their im-
pairments. Obtaining health services is, therefore, of particular 
importance to members of the disability community.113 Howev-
er, individuals with disabilities experience significant barriers 
with regard to their ability to access care, resulting in substan-
tial health disparities.114
Research reveals that people with disabilities endure nu-
merous types of inequities with respect to their health. Despite 
using health services at a greater rate than people without dis-
abilities, individuals with disabilities report lower levels of 
overall health,
 
115 including a higher incidence of secondary con-
ditions.116 Further, although people with disabilities consume 
health care more frequently, they enjoy less access to preven-
tive measures.117 Barriers to accessing care—like antiquated 
medical equipment or insufficient training—disproportionately 
impact the disability community.118 Thus, while disability 
rights advocates champion understanding disability as primari-
ly a social issue,119
 
munity does not diminish their importance, severity, or pervasiveness as is-
sues of health-care access specifically for people with disabilities. 
 on a purely practical level certain impair-
ments may result in the need for various health services. An 
 113. Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 53 (noting that “because 
many persons with disabilities have ongoing and sometimes extensive health 
care needs as a result of their disabilities, legal protection against discrimina-
tion in accessing health care services can be of critical importance”); see also 
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 9–10 (explaining that 
“[p]eople with disabilities comprise the largest and most important health care 
consumer group in the United States”). 
 114. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 1 (finding that 
“[p]eople with disabilities experience significant health disparities and barri-
ers to health care, as compared with people who do not have disabilities”); see 
also Karen Hwang et al., Access and Coordination of Health Care Service for 
People with Disabilities, 20 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 28, 28 (2009) (stating 
that for people with disabilities the risk of suboptimal care is “especially prob-
lematic because individuals with disabilities face multiple barriers to receiving 
quality health care services, ranging from structural barriers (e.g., physical 
access to doctors’ offices) to procedural barriers (e.g., difficulty scheduling ap-
pointments, problems obtaining insurance coverage)”). 
 115. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 9, 23; see also id. at 
34–35 (“About half of people with complex limitations and one-third of people 
with basic actions difficulties assessed their health status as fair or poor, com-
pared with the three-fourths of adults who did not have a disability who as-
sessed their health as excellent or very good.”). 
 116. Id. at 23. 
 117. Id. at 9, 23.  
 118. Id. 
 119. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
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inability to access those necessary services lowers the overall 
level of health for many individuals with disabilities. 
In analyzing the reasons behind these disparities, an addi-
tional discussion of health insurance provides a logical point of 
departure. People with disabilities frequently find themselves 
either un- or under-insured.120 Not only do barriers to obtaining 
health insurance limit access to coverage, but—because of the 
cost of health services—access to health insurance also serves 
as a proxy for access to health care generally.121
1. Public Benefits and Health Disparities 
 Significantly, 
people with disabilities encounter numerous obstacles to ac-
cessing care within both the private and the public health-
insurance systems.  
As discussed, most people with disabilities who have 
health insurance are insured through government-run pro-
grams, such as Medicaid and Medicare.122 In fact, Medicaid has 
been described as the “largest single source of health insurance 
and long-term care and the largest source of public financial 
support for people with disabilities.”123
 
 120. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 
 Although public health 
insurance serves as an important resource for individuals with 
28, at 1 (finding that 
“[p]eople with disabilities frequently lack either health insurance or coverage 
for necessary services, such as specialty care, long-term services, prescription 
medications, durable medical equipment, and assistive technologies”); id. at 
11–12 (noting that “[t]he health care system in the United States is complex, 
highly fragmented, and sometimes overly restrictive in terms of program eligi-
bility . . . leav[ing] some people with disabilities with no health care coverage 
and others with cost-sharing obligations and limits on benefits that prevent 
them from obtaining health-preserving prescription medications, medical 
equipment, specialty care, dental and vision care, long-term care, and care co-
ordination”). 
 121. See Katherine Unger Davis, Racial Disparities in Childhood Obesity: 
Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 313, 314 
n.5 (2011) (“Because ‘health insurance facilitates entry into the health care 
system,’ levels of insurance coverage have been used as a proxy to analyze ac-
cess to healthcare more generally.” (quoting AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RE-
SEARCH & QUALITY, NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT 113 (2007), 
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhdr07/nhdr07.pdf)); see also NAT’L 
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 38 (explaining that “[i]nsurance 
coverage tends to determine whether people with disabilities visit a doctor 
regularly or have access to a usual source of medical care”). 
 122. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 123. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 110 (quoting Helping 
Families with Needed Care: Medicaid’s Role for People with Disabilities: Tes-
timony Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Health 
110th Cong. 22 (2008) (testimony of Diane Rowland)). 
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disabilities in need of health care, those programs are not with-
out their limitations. For instance, the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal funding agencies re-
sponsible for those programs, collect data related to the public 
health insurance system but do not assess the compliance of 
those programs with the ADA.124
Despite being the primary source of health insurance for 
people with disabilities, Medicaid has several shortcomings 
that contribute to the health disparities experienced by the dis-
ability community. First, beneficiaries have trouble locating 
health-care providers who will accept Medicaid payments.
 
125 
Thus, low-income people with disabilities encounter program-
matic barriers even before the treatment relationship begins. 
Furthermore, structural problems persist after a Medicaid re-
cipient finds a physician willing to accept her. Health-care pro-
fessionals who serve Medicaid recipients with disabilities re-
port impediments to providing care resulting from improper 
referrals and accessibility issues.126 Medicaid managed care 
programs suffer from poor coordination of care, reduced con-
sumer choice, and a limited ability to access specialists, thereby 
negatively impacting health care for people with disabilities.127 
Additionally, Medicaid only provides limited coverage. It fails 
to cover many essential services, such as dental, vision, and 
personal assistance, as well as durable medical equipment.128
 
 124. Id. at 21 (“Federal health care funding agencies such as the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) do not conduct oversight of Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) architectural and programmatic accessibility 
compliance by states, health plans, and medical providers or assess health 
providers’ disability cultural competence.”). 
 
 125. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 45. 
 126. Hwang et al., supra note 114, at 29 (“A Texas survey of 62 general 
practitioners, family practitioners, internists, and obstetrician-gynecologists 
serving Medicaid recipients revealed that despite the requirements of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, a substantial portion of primary care physi-
cians are unable to serve people with disabilities, owing to inappropriate re-
ferrals and structural inaccessibility.”). 
 127. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 88 (“In some cases, 
Medicaid managed care programs are poorly equipped to meet the needs of 
people with disabilities . . . . Problem areas include inadequate care coordina-
tion, limited access to specialists, limited consumer choice, and inadequate 
risk adjustment for capitation rates.”). 
 128. Id. at 45 (“For many of these low-income beneficiaries, however, es-
sential health care services—including dental and vision care, medical sup-
plies, and durable medical equipment—may be out of reach financially, even 
with low cost-sharing under Medicaid.”); see also Hwang et al., supra note 114, 
at 29 (“Among a sample of 502 Missouri residents with disabilities who were 
receiving Medicaid services in central Missouri, nearly two thirds reported dif-
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Lastly, while Medicaid includes a home health benefit, states 
can limit coverage based on factors like “medical necessity.”129 
Many “optional” services may actually be necessary for people 
with certain kinds of disabilities to function.130 Taken as a 
whole, these structural and programmatic barriers lead to 
health disparities for individuals with disabilities insured 
through Medicaid.131 It is, therefore, not surprising that Medi-
caid recipients have expressed dissatisfaction with the program 
and its benefits.132
Medicare also has its limits. Medicare recipients pay more 
out-of-pocket than their Medicaid counterparts.
 
133 These in-
creased costs may lead Medicare beneficiaries to choose to forgo 
necessary care or equipment.134 Like Medicaid, Medicare does 
not cover a variety of important health services, including vi-
sion, dental, or long-term care.135
 
ficulties in obtaining needed health care services—particularly dental, opto-
metric, and personal assistance services.”). 
 Moreover, people under sixty-
five who wish to qualify for Medicare through SSDI must wait 
 129. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 110 (“The category of 
‘medical supplies, equipment and appliances suitable for use in the home’ is a 
mandatory home health service benefit, but a state can establish reasonable 
standards under the Medicaid statute and set limits on coverage based on 
such factors as ‘medical necessity’ or ‘utilization control.’”). 
 130. Id. (“The distinction between mandatory and optional services can be 
particularly important for people with disabilities, because many optional ser-
vices can be critical to maintaining health and the ability to function in the 
community.”). 
 131. Id. at 111 (“A state’s tolerance of structural and programmatic barri-
ers in the multiple levels of its health care system is an ongoing violation of 
the Medicaid program and greatly contributes to the health care disparities 
endured by people with disabilities.”). 
 132. Hwang et al., supra note 114, at 29 (“In a 1999–2000 national survey, 
Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities reported dissatisfaction in key areas of 
access and care.”). 
 133. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 45. 
 134. Id. (“Both Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries . . . have reported diffi-
culties obtaining the care and services they require. With higher copayments, 
Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities report significant cost-related prob-
lems including forgoing needed equipment, postponing care, and paying for 
long-term care.”). 
 135. Id. at 113 (“[T]he program contains significant gaps in coverage bene-
fits for items or services that can be both expensive and particularly important 
for maintaining function and independence. For instance, Medicare does not 
pay for long-term care services at home or in an institution, routine dental 
care or dentures, routine vision care or eyeglasses, or hearing exams hearing 
aids.”). 
  
2013] DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW 1995 
 
two years to obtain coverage.136 During that period, many of 
them go uninsured.137
Given these limitations, disability rights advocates have 
recommended that CMS update their definitions of “medical 
equipment” and “medical necessity” and pay for interpreters, 
rehabilitative services, and assistive technologies for people 
with disabilities to address these health disparities.
 
138
2. Private Health Insurance and Health Disparities 
 
Characteristics of the private insurance market likewise 
contribute to the health disparities faced by people with disabil-
ities. As discussed, insurers may exclude them outright or may 
impose limitations or caps on what the policy covers.139 Further, 
health-status based rating has compounded the problem.140 
Traditionally when insurers have offered policies to individuals 
with disabilities, those policies came with heightened premi-
ums.141 Even in the group health-insurance system, people with 
disabilities are likely to pay more out-of-pocket because of cost-
sharing mechanisms, like deductibles and co-payments, com-
bined with their increased need for medical services.142
Similar to the structural impediments people with disabili-
ties encounter in public health insurance, certain aspects of 
private health insurance may thwart their access to needed 
 Yet, be-
yond the difficulties discussed in the preceding part, people 
with disabilities also experience substantial barriers to obtain-
ing equipment and services that are essential to their health-
care needs. 
 
 136. Id. at 45 (“Medicare imposes a 2-year waiting period for coverage for 
individuals who are under age 65 who become eligible for the program when 
they receive Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI).”). 
 137. Id. at 113 (“Another serious gap involves people who become disabled 
before age 65. They must wait 2 years after they establish eligibility for SSDI 
before they can receive Medicare coverage, a period during which many do not 
have any insurance coverage.”). 
 138. Id. at 95 (recommending that “the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS) should update their current definitions of durable medical 
equipment and medical necessity, which are outdated and give little consider-
ation to increasing an individual’s functional status”); id. at 94–95 (recom-
mending that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services pay for interpret-
ers, rehabilitative services, and assistive technologies for people with 
disabilities). 
 139. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 141. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28. 
 142. See supra note 29. 
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care, thereby leading to health disparities. Samuel Bagenstos 
identifies two characteristics of the private health-insurance 
industry that substantially restrict the care available to people 
with disabilities: (1) emphasizing acute care and (2) limiting 
coverage to “medically necessary” treatments.143
Health care generally focuses on addressing acute—not on-
going—needs.
 
144 Perhaps the centrality of acute care stems 
from the notion that “health” is the default state, making dis-
ease or disability exceptional events.145 Under such a model, the 
goal of medical care is not to provide chronic treatment but ra-
ther to restore health following isolated incidents of disease or 
injury. Because people with disabilities often have on-going 
health-care needs, the focus on acute care means that private 
health insurance will not cover those required services over the 
long-term.146
Moreover, like their government-funded counterparts, 
many private health insurers have not traditionally provided 
adequate coverage for assistive technologies or durable medical 
equipment.
 The resulting gaps in coverage impede the ability 
of individuals with disabilities to obtain needed health services, 
thus leading to health disparities.  
147 Policies that limit their coverage to “medically 
necessary” treatments have invoked those clauses to deny 
payment for any number of assistive devices, including hearing 
aids, prostheses, and even wheelchairs.148 Further exacerbating 
the problem, private health insurers have chosen to limit their 
annual payments for durable medical equipment irrespective of 
its medical necessity.149
 
 143. Bagenstos, supra note 
 Not having access to needed equipment 
5, at 30 (“Two aspects of private insurance 
largely account for this effect: (1) the tilt of insurance policies toward acute, as 
opposed to chronic care; and (2) the typical requirement that covered treat-
ments be ‘medically necessary.’”). 
 144. Hwang et al., supra note 114, at 31 (noting that “[t]raditional models 
of health care delivery have generally been designed for acute rather than 
chronic care”). 
 145. See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 306 (explaining 
that “[w]ithin social contract theory, disability and illness are not viewed as 
part of the human experience, but rather as exceptional”). 
 146. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that for private health insurers 
will cover a treatment “when it is a short-term response to an acute condition, 
but not when it is a continuing response to a chronic condition”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 31–32. 
 149. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 46 (“[P]rivate insur-
ance plans increasingly limit annual payments for durable medical equipment 
such as wheelchairs, crutches, braces, and ventilators, regardless of medical 
necessity and at a level that makes the individual’s out-of-pocket costs for 
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and services negatively impacts the health of individuals with 
disabilities. 
Inaccessible medical equipment also contributes to the 
health disparities experienced by people with disabilities.150 As 
a result, people with disabilities may be unable to obtain basic 
preventive care services because of inaccessible exam tables 
and screening equipment, thereby leading to later detection 
and treatment of serious health conditions such as breast, cer-
vical, and prostate cancers.151 These factors contribute to both a 
lower level of overall health and higher incidence of late detec-
tion and secondary conditions.152 In a particularly chilling ex-
ample, a woman who used a wheelchair approached her doctor 
regarding a lump in her breast.153 In lieu of performing a 
mammogram, her physician concluded that she had over-
developed her pectoral muscle from using her wheelchair.154 
Later, she was diagnosed with breast cancer.155 By that time, 
the cancer was terminal. She died within three years.156
3. Public Health and Health Disparities 
 
Although people with disabilities face substantial health 
disparities, public health research has historically failed to rec-
ognize people with disabilities as a health disparities popula-
tion with its own unique health-care needs.157
 
higher priced items such as motorized wheelchairs prohibitively expensive.”). 
  
 150. Elizabeth Pendo has written extensively on the topic of inaccessible 
medical equipment as an impediment to health care access for people with 
disabilities. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pendo, Disability, Equipment Barriers, and 
Women’s Health: Using the ADA to Provide Meaningful Access, 2 ST. LOUIS U. 
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 15, 17 (2008); Elizabeth Pendo, Reducing Disparities 
Through Health Care Reform: Disability and Accessible Medical Equipment, 4 
UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1057 (2010) [hereinafter Pendo, Reducing Disparities]. 
 151. See Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1060–65 (describ-
ing the affect of inaccessible examination tables, examination chairs, weight 
scales, and X-ray and other imaging equipment on access to preventative ser-
vices and screenings for people with disabilities); see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON 
DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 49 (explaining that health-care providers “fre-
quently conduct examinations or diagnostic tests while patients are seated in 
their wheelchairs, which can generate inaccurate test results or conceal physi-
cian evidence required for appropriate diagnosis and treatment”). 
 152. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 56. 
 153. Id. at 58. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. The term “health disparity” holds multiple meanings. NAT’L COUNCIL 
ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 29 (“The phrase ‘health disparity’ is widely 
used in the articulation of health care research, funding, and service delivery 
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Prior to 2010, the majority of federally funded research 
programs did not recognize people with disabilities as a health 
disparities population.158 The Department of Health and Hu-
man Services first recognized “disability” as a relevant popula-
tion for public health purposes in 2010, when the Surgeon Gen-
eral issued the report Call to Action to Improve the Health and 
Wellness of Persons with Disabilities and when Healthy People 
2010 defined disability as a demographic trait.159 Yet despite 
this limited inclusion, major federal public health entities—
most notably the National Center on Minority Health and 
Health Disparities—still do not include people with disabilities 
in their health disparities research.160 Moreover, because no 
single federal agency acts as a clearinghouse for disability-
related public health information, any research related to peo-
ple with disabilities and health-care access occurs piecemeal.161 
It is, therefore, difficult to ascertain the true extent of public 
health initiatives impacting individuals with disabilities.162 
These shortcomings have resulted in a lack of comprehensive 
data documenting the experiences of individuals with disabili-
ties in obtaining health care. This absence ultimately hinders 
the development of coherent, coordinated public health efforts 
targeting the disability community.163
 
priorities by both public and private organizations. The exact definition of 
health disparity varies. In some cases, it includes many population subgroups 
and indicators; in other cases, it is narrowly restricted to specific populations 
and health conditions. In broad terms, ‘health disparity’ can be defined as ‘dif-
ferences in health outcomes and health care access that occur between specific 
populations and the general population’ . . . . In most instances in the United 
States, when the phrase ‘health disparity’ is used, it is understood to describe 
circumstances in which differences are interpreted to indicate bias or unac-
ceptable disproportion in health outcomes, aspects of health care system ac-
cess, or differences in health treatment for one group compared with the gen-
eral population.”). 
 
 158. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 1.  
 159. Id. at 12. 
 160. Id. at 12. 
 161. Id. at 12–13. 
 162. Id. at 12. 
 163. Id. at 13 (“Specific structural problems evident Federal agency disabil-
ity research functionally impede the development of a unified, coherent plan 
for disability and health research and program development. Specifically, (1) 
the level of funding and research is wholly inadequate to spur a coherent in-
vestigative strategy that will inform policy and planning for the growing num-
ber of people who will acquire disabilities with age and for the overall future 
impact of disability on society; and (2) within the Federal research community, 
commitment to disability health disparities and health promotion research is 
weak, and coordination mechanisms are lacking.”). 
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Given the lack of good, reliable data on disability and 
health-care access, perhaps it comes as no surprise that medi-
cal professionals lack adequate training regarding disability 
competency. The treatment needs of people with disabilities are 
not traditionally part of core medical curriculum,164 leaving 
many health-care professionals uneducated in meeting the 
needs of the disability community. This ignorance ranks among 
the most significant obstacles to adequate health care that peo-
ple with disabilities face.165 Consequently, disability rights ad-
vocates have pushed for additional research into the barriers to 
health-care access faced by people with disabilities.166
Thus, the ubiquitous physical and structural barriers peo-
ple with disabilities regularly encounter permeate all aspects of 
their lives, including their ability to access health care. Signifi-
cantly, an inability to obtain needed health services adversely 
affects other areas of people’s lives, such as employment.
 
167
B. FAILURE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS PARADIGM 
 
While civil rights law may facially cover various areas of 
health-care delivery, those statutes have by and large been in-
effective in ensuring adequate access to care for the disability 
community. 
People with disabilities experience serious health dispari-
ties. Although designed to improve access and integration for 
 
 164. Id. at 13 (“Disability competency is not a core curriculum requirement 
for (1) accreditation or receipt of Federal funding for most medical and dental 
schools and other professional health care training institutions; or (2) for hos-
pitals to participate in federally funded medical student internship and resi-
dency programs. In addition, applicants who seek either a medical or other 
professional health care license are generally not required to demonstrate dis-
ability competency.”). 
 165. Id.; see also id. at 49 (explaining that “health care providers hold in-
correct assumptions and stereotypes about people with disabilities, which can 
affect every aspect of care and can result in inadequate and inappropriate 
care”). 
 166. See, e.g., id. at 125 (suggesting that if the Agency for Healthcare Re-
search and Quality “promoted research that clearly identified the various bar-
riers encountered by people with disabilities as a priority population when 
seeking health care, it could help advocates document a statistically accurate 
record of, for example, the extent to which health care technologies, facilities, 
and equipment remain inaccessible to people with disabilities and bolster ef-
forts to effect change”). 
 167. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 22–23 (noting the failure of the ADA 
to improve the level of employment for people with disabilities); id. at 26–27 
(attributing that failure in part to the structure of the pre-ACA health-
insurance system and its resulting barriers to access). 
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the disability community, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA 
have failed to have a lasting impact in the area of health care. 
This failure can in part be attributed to the statutes’ civil rights 
structure.168
The failure of the civil rights paradigm, however, does not 
stem from an explicit lack of coverage. Both the Rehabilitation 
Act and the ADA extend to health-care settings. As noted, the 
Rehabilitation Act requires federally funded entities to ensure 
equal access to their programs and services for people with dis-
abilities.
 
169 The statute, therefore, applies to clinics, hospitals, 
and other health-care providers that accept federal monies, 
such as Medicare or Medicaid.170 Further, the relevant regula-
tions prohibit covered entities from providing any benefit or 
service that denies people with disabilities the opportunity to 
participate in or benefit from Medicaid, affords people with dis-
abilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from health 
care services that are not equal to that afforded others, or pro-
vides people with disabilities an aid, benefit or service that is 
not as effective as that provided to others.171 Despite its ap-
plicability, the courts have been reluctant to interpret the Re-
habilitation Act’s protections aggressively with respect to is-
sues of health care.172
Similarly, certain provisions of the ADA also apply—at 
least facially—to health-care providers. The ADA’s legislative 
history indicates that people with disabilities encountered nu-
merous barriers to accessing health care,
 
173
 
 168. See Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 
 and the findings of 
the original statute stated that “discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities persists in such critical areas 
31, at 88–89 (proposing 
that part of the ADA’s failure to improve health-care access for people with 
disabilities is attributable to the fact that “the ADA is a civil rights statute, 
not a health care reform statute”). 
 169. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 170. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 99 (“Section 504 pro-
hibits discrimination against otherwise qualified people with disabilities un-
der any program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance; it di-
rectly applies to state Medicaid agencies and the many corporate health care 
entities and providers that receive Federal monies through Medicaid, Medi-
care, or Federal block grants.”). 
 171. 34 C.F.R. § 104.52(a) (2013). 
 172. Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 53 (explaining that 
courts took a “hands-off approach to health care issues” with respect to Section 
504). 
 173. Id. at 51 (“[T]he voluminous legislative history that underpins the 
ADA includes ample testimony regarding the barriers that people with disabil-
ities faced in obtaining health care.”). 
  
2013] DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW 2001 
 
as . . . health services.”174
As written, the ADA applies to both public and private 
health care providers. Title II covers state and local entities,
 Thus, barriers to health-care access 
were among the impediments Congress sought to dismantle 
when passing the ADA.  
175 
including public health programs and providers that accept 
state funding like Medicaid.176 It provides that government in-
stitutions cannot exclude, deny benefits to, or discriminate 
against qualified individuals with disabilities.177 Likewise, Title 
III, which governs privately owned “public accommodations,” 
applies to physicians’ offices and hospitals,178 regardless of 
whether the provider is operating out of a private residence.179 
That provision prevents commercial entities from denying peo-
ple with disabilities the full and equal enjoyment of their goods 
and services.180 The law requires the programs, vendors, and 
service-providers covered by Titles II and III to make reasona-
ble modifications to facilitate the equitable participation of in-
dividuals with disabilities.181
 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2006). 
 Thus, the ADA arguably man-
 175. See id. § 12131(1). 
 176. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 99 (stating that 
“State Medicaid agencies . . . fall under Title II of the ADA”). 
 177. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be ex-
cluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity.”). 
 178. Id. §§ 12181(7)(F), 12182(a). In fact, the definition of a “public accom-
modation” explicitly includes an “insurance office, professional office of a 
health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment.” Id. 
§ 12181(7)(F). 
 179. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.207 (2013). 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (“No individual shall be discriminated against on 
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public ac-
commodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place 
of public accommodation.”). 
 181. See id. § 12131 (defining a “qualified individual” for Title II purposes 
as “[a]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifica-
tions to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communica-
tion, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, 
meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the 
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity”); see also 
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 99 (“In the health care con-
text, this means that a health care entity must modify its policies, practices, 
and procedures when necessary to enable people with disabilities to gain full 
and equal access to its services, unless a requested modification constitutes a 
fundamental alteration of the health care service itself.”). 
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dates that people with disabilities enjoy equal access to health 
care.182 However, much like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA 
has not had a meaningful impact on access to health care for 
people with disabilities.183
Civil rights statutes share certain characteristics with re-
spect to their purpose, as well as the content of their protec-
tions. As discussed, antidiscrimination laws seek to eliminate 
group subordination.
 The civil rights structure of those 
laws offers an explanation as to why. 
184 Consequently, their protections forbid 
covered entities from discriminating on the basis of a particular 
trait.185 However, whether specific conduct rises to the level of 
actionable discrimination is a question frequently left to judi-
cial interpretation.186 Because civil rights statutes prohibit dis-
criminatory conduct—opposed to providing explicit substantive 
entitlements—courts have been free to interpret the Rehabili-
tation Act and the ADA very narrowly in the context of health 
care. Further, civil rights statutes’ emphasis on individualized 
instances of discrimination and private enforcement renders 
those laws ill-equipped for addressing health disparities occur-
ring at the population level.187
Because of its inherent limitations, the civil rights para-
digm has failed to achieve meaningful access to health services 
in the three areas of health law discussed: (1) public health in-
 
 
 182. See Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1071 ( “The ADA 
requires equal access to health care.”). 
 183. Id. at 1065 (“Although the ADA establishes the necessary foundation 
for ensuring equal and accessible care for people with disabilities, people with 
disabilities continue to experience significant barriers to care, including basic 
preventive health services.”); see also Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 
31, at 86–87 (“A frank assessment shows that, aside from its impact on the in-
dividual encounters between patient and provider, the ADA’s application has 
[as of 2000] been neither forceful nor sweeping.”). 
 184. See supra note 42 for a discussion of an antisubordination orientation 
for antidiscrimination law. 
 185. Protections framed as blanket prohibitions on the consideration of a 
particular trait are arguably anticlassification, not antisubordination, in na-
ture. However, even those protections may be in response to group subordina-
tion. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil 
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 9 (2003). 
 186. For example, in the instances described below, the Supreme Court 
was deciding whether policies and practices that had a tangible negative im-
pact on people with disabilities constituted “discrimination” for the purposes of 
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See discussion infra notes 188–205 and 
accompanying text. 
 187. See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
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surance and government benefits; (2) private insurance; and (3) 
public health. I will discuss each in turn. 
First, with regard to social-welfare programs, the courts 
have been reluctant to apply civil rights legislation in a manner 
that ensures health-care access for people with disabilities. 
Even before the passage of the ADA, the Supreme Court se-
verely limited the applicability of antidiscrimination-style legis-
lation to public health-insurance programs, like Medicaid. In 
the 1985 landmark case, Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme 
Court held that the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to a state’s 
Medicaid rationing decision, regardless of its potentially dis-
parate impact.188 As of 1980, Tennessee’s Medicaid program 
cost more than the state legislature chose to fund.189 Faced with 
this budgeting dilemma, the state proposed limiting Medicaid 
recipients to fourteen days of in-patient hospital care per 
year.190 While neutral on its face, that restriction would likely 
have impacted individuals with disabilities more severely, as 
they tend to consume more health services.191 Consequently, 
Tennessee Medicaid beneficiaries filed a class action lawsuit, 
alleging the decision violated the Rehabilitation Act.192 The Su-
preme Court unanimously upheld the state’s decision, holding 
that limiting the number of covered hospital days did not elim-
inate “meaningful access” to the Medicaid program for people 
with disabilities.193 The Court reasoned that because both recip-
ients with and without disabilities received an identical benefit 
(in this case fourteen days of in-patient care), each group en-
joyed the same access.194 Perhaps most importantly, the Court 
construed the benefit at stake as a “package of health care ser-
vices,” not adequate, equitable, or accessible health care.195
 
 188. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 
Thus, under Choate, public health-insurance providers do not 
discriminate on the basis of disability, even when their deci-
 189. Id. at 289. 
 190. The state had previously covered twenty days. Id.  
 191. Id. at 290. According to the evidence, 27.4% of people with disabilities 
who received Medicaid used over fourteen days of in-patient hospital care, 
compared with only 7.8% of recipients without disabilities. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 306–09. Bagenstos identifies Choate as the advent of the “ac-
cess/content” distinction he explores in much of his work on disability rights 
law. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 46–49. 
 194. Choate, 469 U.S. at 302. 
 195. Id. at 303. 
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sions negatively impact people with disabilities, so long as they 
provide identical benefits.196
Further, courts have been likewise reluctant to enforce civ-
il rights legislation with respect to private insurance. With its 
focus on facilitating independence for people with disabilities, 
the ADA can be understood as an effort to shift the provision of 
care for the disability community from the public to the private 
sector.
 
197 However, as discussed, the legislation includes a safe-
harbor provision that allows insurers, health-care providers, 
and other benefit administrators to engage in traditional risk 
assessment and underwriting activities, as long as those activi-
ties have a sound actuarial basis.198 The ADA, therefore, does 
not outlaw any of the traditional insurance practices that dis-
advantage people with disabilities, such as preexisting condi-
tion exclusions, caps on coverage, and health status-based rat-
ing.199 Interestingly, however, courts have not relied on the 
safe-harbor provision when rejecting challenges to insurance 
practices that disadvantage people with disabilities. For in-
stance, in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., two HIV-
positive plaintiffs challenged their private insurer’s caps on 
HIV-related coverage as a violation of Title III of the ADA.200 In 
lieu of invoking the safe-harbor, the Seventh Circuit instead 
upheld the caps as nondiscriminatory because the insurer of-
fered the same products to all of its insureds, regardless of HIV 
status.201
 
 196. Scholars have challenged whether the access granted under Choate is 
truly “meaningful” with respect to the varying needs of the disabled and non-
disabled. See, e.g., Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alex-
ander v. Choate: “Meaningful Access” to Health Care for People with Disabili-
ties, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 451–52 (2008) (“A fourteen-day hospital stay 
is ‘meaningful’ for those whose conditions can be adequately treated within a 
fourteen-day period. For those whose conditions require more, such as patients 
requiring high-dose chemotherapy plus stem cell rescue, fourteen days of hos-
pitalization might as well be no benefit at all.”). 
 Thus, courts have relied on the content of the policy or 
 197. Parmet, supra note 96, at 340 (“The ADA can be seen not as the public 
recognition of the needs of the disabled, but as a way of supporting the privati-
zation of the disabled’s health care needs”). 
 198. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 199. Gostin, supra note 76, at 182 (“The ADA, therefore, does not restrict 
an insurer, health care provider, or any entity that administers benefit plans 
from carrying on its normal underwriting activities. This includes the use of 
preexisting condition clauses in health insurance contracts, the placing of caps 
or other limits on coverage for certain procedures or treatments, or the charg-
ing of a premium to persons with higher risks.”). 
 200. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 201. Id. at 558–62. 
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benefit offered—not the relative utility of that policy or benefit 
to the individual policy-holders or beneficiaries—when deciding 
whether discrimination occurred.202
Importantly, the courts have interpreted the Rehabilitation 
Act and ADA to leave the patient-professional relationship 
largely intact. In the leading case on the subject, the Second 
Circuit held that the Rehabilitation Act does not apply to 
treatment decisions.
 
203 Likewise, the ADA preserves a physi-
cian’s ability to make treatment and other decisions, such as 
accepting or rejecting a patient, so long as she does not base 
her decision on the patient’s disability.204
We do not in this opinion hold that the ADA imposes on the States a 
‘standard of care’ for whatever medical services they render, or that 
the ADA requires States to ‘provide a certain level of benefits to indi-
viduals with disabilities.’ We do hold, however, that States must ad-
here to the ADA’s nondiscrimination requirement with regard to the 
services they in fact provide.
 Justice Ginsburg, 
writing for the majority, further reiterated this point in a foot-
note in the 1999 Title II case, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring. 
She opined: 
205
It has, therefore, been the position of the courts that civil rights 
laws, like the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, do not ensure a 
basic level of medical care or benefits for people with disabili-
ties, but rather protect individuals with disabilities from being 
treated differently than patients and beneficiaries without dis-
abilities. 
 
The ADA also has its limits in ensuring accessible medical 
equipment. In the over two decades since Congress passed the 
ADA, only a handful of lawsuits have challenged inaccessible 
 
 202. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 40–41 (explaining that “[w]ith only a few 
exceptions, [courts] have not found it necessary to rely on the safe harbor pro-
vision” and have instead employed the “access/content” distinction “[s]o long as 
the insurer offers people with disabilities the opportunity to purchase policies 
on the same terms as everyone else, it has not denied them access to the bene-
fit received by the nondisabled” even if the caps and exclusions are for specific 
disabling conditions). 
 203. See United States v. Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 157–61 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 204. See Gostin, supra note 76, at 179 (“The ADA does not guarantee ac-
cess to health care but merely requires that the refusal to provide equal access 
cannot be based on a person’s disability. A provider’s health care decision may 
be based, in part, on cost. Providing health services of inferior quality or not 
providing services at all because of a person’s inability to pay may be unethi-
cal, but it is not necessarily unlawful.”). 
 205. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 603 n.14 (1999) (cita-
tion omitted). 
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medical equipment as violations of the legislation.206 Of the four 
private actions filed against health-care providers lacking ac-
cessible medical equipment, all four settled.207 Additionally, the 
Department of Justice took part in several actions against 
health-care providers for architectural barriers and inaccessible 
medical equipment from 1994 to 2009.208 Despite this flurry of 
activity, both private and public ADA litigation have failed to 
increase the availability of accessible medical equipment to a 
meaningful extent.209
Thus, while the ADA indicates a strong ideological opposi-
tion to discriminating against individuals with disabilities in 
health care, its practical effect on the health disparities experi-
enced by people with disabilities has been limited.
 
210 The Na-
tional Council on Disability has criticized the Department of 
Justice and the Department of Health and Human Services for 
failing to enforce both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA ag-
gressively in the context of health care.211
 
 206. Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 
 Because of this lim-
ited enforcement, civil rights laws are an ineffective means to 
150, at 1067 tbl.1; see also id. 
at 1067–69 (summarizing the private ADA actions against facilities with inac-
cessible medical equipment). 
 207. Id. at 1069. 
 208. Id. (“Between 1994 and September 2009, the Department was in-
volved in fifty-five actions involving architectural barriers in a health care set-
ting, and twelve actions involving inaccessible medical equipment . . . .”); see 
also id. at 1070 tbl.2; id. at 1070–71 (describing the Department of Justice ac-
tions). 
 209. Id. at 1071. Elizabeth Pendo has attributed this result in part to a 
lack of sufficiently detailed accessibility requirements for medical equipment. 
Id. at 1065, 1071. 
 210. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 1, 14 (“The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has had limited impact on how health care is 
delivered for people with disabilities. Significant architectural and program-
matic accessibility barriers still remain, and health care providers continue to 
lack awareness about steps they are required to take to ensure that patients 
with disabilities have access to appropriate, culturally competent care.”). The-
se limitations have arguably been apparent since the law’s passing. See 
Gostin, supra note 76, at 180 (“The ADA, then, in only a limited sense tears 
down barriers to access to health services. It steadfastly refuses to allow a per-
son to be turned away because of the provider’s fears and biases toward the 
disability. However, it remains uncertain as to what extent the act will help to 
ensure access to health care for those who arguably need it most.”). 
 211. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 14 (“The U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services are charged with responsibility for enforcing 
the ADA and Section 504 in health care settings, yet they have taken on only a 
relatively small number of cases involving disability discrimination in health 
care, particularly when offices of health providers are involved.”). 
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address the health disparities people with disabilities so often 
face.212
Finally, civil rights legislation provides an improper tool to 
address disability-related inequities within public health. To 
start, much of the disadvantage experienced by people with 
disabilities in that context results not from overt discrimina-
tion, but rather from the failure to include the disability com-
munity as a relevant public health population.
 
213 The Rehabili-
tation Act and the ADA, with their primary reliance on private 
enforcement mechanisms, are geared more toward combating 
individual instances of discrimination rather than systematic 
exclusion at the population level.214 Moreover, courts have val-
ued public health concerns over those of individuals with disa-
bilities, even in the face of civil rights challenges.215 This prac-
tice evolved into the doctrine known as the “direct threat” 
defense, which allows covered entities (including employers and 
commercial entities) to differentiate on the basis of disability in 
the face of “significant risk to the health or safety of others that 
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”216 Thus, 
covered entities are allowed to make decisions based on an in-
dividual’s disability when that decision implicates issues of 
public health, such as the spread of communicable disease.217 
Importantly, the determination of what constitutes a “signifi-
cant risk” is influenced by public health officials.218
 
 212. Id. at 14–15 (“Without robust enforcement, the disability rights laws 
are ineffective tools for challenging discriminatory conduct or care that people 
with disabilities often report experiencing.”); see also id. at 18 (“Limited im-
plementation of key disability rights laws by health care systems, managed 
care organizations, and health care providers directly affects the quality of 
care available to people with disabilities.”). 
 Direct 
 213. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text. 
 214. Michael Waterstone has discussed the limits of public and private en-
forcement mechanisms of Titles II and III of the ADA. See Michael 
Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807 (2005). 
 215. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 909 F.2d 820, 833 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that a hospital request to test an employee for HIV did not violate the 
Rehabilitation Act). 
 216. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2006). While the statute explicitly protects deci-
sions made to avoid or mitigate “significant risk to the health or safety of oth-
ers,” judicial interpretation has extended the direct threat defense to apply to 
significant risks to the disabled individual herself. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85–86 (2002). 
 217. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). 
 218. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE 
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 79–86 (2009) [hereinafter BAGENSTOS, LAW 
AND CONTRADICTIONS] (discussing the creation of the “direct threat” doctrine 
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threat doctrine is justifiable on public health and safety 
grounds, as long as the discriminatory behavior eliminates or 
mitigates a potential public health concern.219
While the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA sought to im-
prove health-care access for people with disabilities, those stat-
utes have not had a lasting impact. They have failed to address 
the underlying structural barriers impeding access to health 
care for people with disabilities, which are at the root of those 
disparities. As discussed, this failure stems in significant part 
from the structure of civil rights statutes. 
 
C. THE NEED FOR ALTERNATE PARADIGMS 
The health disparities discussed above affect not only an 
individual’s wellness but also her ability to participate in other 
aspects of daily living. When someone experiences poor health, 
it impacts her independence, her ability to work, and her over-
all quality of life. As a result, health disparities are not re-
stricted to issues of medical care: they may adversely touch 
myriad facets of an individual’s existence. 
Academics writing in the area of disability legal studies 
have explored the limitations of civil rights legislation as a tool 
for promoting equality, access, and integration for people with 
disabilities. Samuel Bagenstos and Ani Satz have provided nu-
anced criticisms of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, both 
generally and with respect to health care. In so doing, they 
have urged disability rights advocates to move beyond the con-
fines of the civil rights approach. 
Bagenstos critiques the shortcomings of civil rights law in 
the workplace. Since passing in 1990, the ADA has not sub-
stantially increased employment for people with disabilities.220 
Bagenstos attributes this failure, at least in part, to the unilat-
eral preference for the antidiscrimination paradigm during the 
first half of the disability rights movement.221
 
and the role of public health entities in determining “significant risk”); see also 
Gostin, supra note 
 As he explains, 
76, at 183 (noting the potential applicability of the ADA to 
public health determinations of “significant risk”). 
 219. See BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 78–79 
(discussing when it is permissible for entities to discriminate against disabili-
ties when public health is at issue). 
 220. The rate of employment of people with disabilities since the passage of 
the ADA may have even declined. See generally THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT 
OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE (David C. Stapleton & Rich-
ard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003). 
 221. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 23 (attributing the continued un- and 
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civil rights legislation prohibits entities from discriminating on 
the basis of a protected trait, in the case of the ADA, disabil-
ity.222 However, individuals with disabilities encounter any 
number of structural barriers—such as an inability to access 
care and other assistive services—in their day-to-day lives.223 
These impediments prevent people with disabilities from apply-
ing for jobs, before they even have the opportunity to face dis-
crimination by their actual or potential employers.224 In short, 
antidiscrimination requirements that outlaw discrimination on 
the basis of disability may ultimately fail to address the under-
lying structural barriers. Thus, as a civil rights statute, the 
ADA is poorly suited to attacking these significant root caus-
es.225 Bagenstos, therefore, maintains that the future of disabil-
ity law might in fact lie in social welfare legislation such as 
Medicaid and Medicare, not antidiscrimination protections.226
Moreover, many of the structural barriers to employment 
faced by people with disabilities relate directly to health-care 
  
 
under-employment of people with disabilities post-ADA to “the inherently lim-
ited nature of antidiscrimination requirements”). 
 222. Id. (“Antidiscrimination requirements can prohibit employers from 
discriminating against qualified people with disabilities who apply for jobs 
. . . .”); see also id. at 51 (“In the dominant conception, antidiscrimination re-
quirements provide a remedy for the defendant’s own wrongful conduct rather 
than for the defendant’s failure to redress a broader societal wrong.”). 
 223. Id. at 25–34 (describing the structural barriers to employment faced 
by people with disabilities). 
 224. Id. at 25 (“[M]any individuals with disabilities face significant barriers 
to employment that operate well before they are ever in a position to be dis-
criminated against by an employer.”). 
 225. See, e.g., id. at 23 (describing the “deep-rooted structural barriers” fac-
ing people with disabilities as the source of inequality and proposing that 
“[a]ntidiscrimination laws like the ADA are a singularly ineffective means of 
eliminating such structural barriers”); see also id. at 54 (“People with disabili-
ties will not move into the workforce in more significant numbers unless the 
law addresses deep-rooted barriers to employment such as the unavailability 
of personal-assistance services, assistive technology, and accessible transpor-
tation, as well as the current structure of our health care system.”).  
Although Bagenstos notes that the accommodation requirement of the 
ADA may seem to mandate some of the positive conduct necessary to elimi-
nate structural barriers, he proposes that a restrictive interpretation of that 
requirement has rendered it more or less into a “classic” antidiscrimination 
mandate, requiring that covered entities only be responsible for their own in-
dividualized exclusionary actions. Id. at 24; see also id. at 42–50 (describing 
how courts’ interpretations of the “‘job-related’ rule” and the “access/content 
distinction” have effectively transformed accommodation into antidiscrimina-
tion). 
 226. See generally id. 
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access generally and health insurance specifically.227 Conse-
quently, Bagenstos dubs the lack of effective access to health 
insurance “the most significant obstacle to entering the work-
force that people with disabilities collectively face.”228 He at-
tributes the centrality of health insurance to the traditionally 
medicalized understanding of “disability” and its related ser-
vices, as well the disability community’s increased need for 
health services.229 Bagenstos also asserts that because private 
health insurance fails to cover needed services and the public-
benefits systems require beneficiaries be incapable of working, 
the traditional structure of American health insurance creates 
disincentives for re-entering the workforce.230
Given the ADA’s limited impact on the employment of peo-
ple with disabilities and its failure to address numerous struc-
tural barriers that continue to impede access, Bagenstos has 
pushed disability rights advocates to look beyond the ADA, and 
the civil rights paradigm generally.
 
231
 
 227. Id. at 26–34 (discussing the barriers to disabled people created by the 
structure of public and private health insurance). 
 In particular, he identi-
fies social welfare law as a possible vehicle for disability advo-
cacy, despite the disability rights movement’s previous rejec-
 228. Id. at 6. 
 229. Id. at 26–27 (“But far and away the most significant barrier to em-
ployment for people with disabilities is the current structure of our health in-
surance system. For two major reasons, health insurance is a matter of espe-
cial importance for those who have disabilities. First, because our society’s 
response to disability has historically been so heavily medicalized, many of the 
services people with disabilities need for independence and labor force partici-
pation—personal assistance and assistive technology being the most obvious—
are typically regarded as ‘medical’ services for which the health insurance sys-
tem is responsible. Second, even without considering those services (which 
might more appropriately be provided in a nonmedical context), it is nonethe-
less true that people with disabilities, on average, have greater health needs 
than do those without disabilities.”). 
 230. Id. at 27 (“In its current form, our health insurance system affirma-
tively disserves the interest of people with disabilities in moving into the 
workforce. The problem is not that people with disabilities are disproportion-
ately uninsured; they are not. The problem is that private insurance—on 
which most nondisabled people rely for their health needs—fails to cover the 
services people with disabilities most need for independence and health. And 
public insurance is saddled with requirements that lock people with disabili-
ties out of the workforce.”). 
 231. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 25 (“[A]ctivists must look past the 
ADA if they are to attack structural employment barriers effectively.”). He, 
however, does not suggest they abandon the civil rights paradigm entirely. See 
BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 11 (“Disability 
rights activists must not abandon the ADA model. They must build on it and, 
indeed, go beyond it.”). 
  
2013] DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW 2011 
 
tion of that legislative model.232
Ani Satz also criticizes the limitations of antidiscrimina-
tion law. She has identified what she calls “fragmentation” 
within disability rights law.
 Thus, while Bagenstos focuses 
his critique of the civil rights paradigm on its failures in the 
employment context, his analysis also pertains to issues of 
health-care access and delivery. 
233 Satz defines fragmentation as 
“treating vulnerabilities associated with impairments as if they 
arise in discrete environments, such as the workplace or par-
ticular places of public accommodation.”234 Fragmentation takes 
place when the law fails to reflect a person’s actual, lived expe-
rience accurately.235 According to Satz, the “targeted legal ap-
proach,” which restricts its protections to certain situational 
contexts, such as employment, transportation or public accom-
modation,236 “fragments the human experience.”237
The resulting legal protections are disjointed, at once im-
plying that impaired individuals only experience disability in 
certain situations and failing to recognize humanity’s universal 
state of vulnerability.
 
238
 
 232. See BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 
 By carving up people’s lives into dis-
218, at 144–
45 (arguing that social welfare programs targeted to people with disabilities 
would be stronger politics); see also Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 74 (“Health 
policy seems an extremely promising area in which to take a universalist ap-
proach. Until the 1990s, American disability rights activists were quite averse 
to urging a broadening of guaranteed health coverage. The movement had 
‘worked so hard for so long to separate the issues of health and disability’ that 
demands for broader health coverage would seem to ‘resurrect[] harmful ste-
reotypes.’ . . . . [A] universal health care system . . . would not send the mes-
sage that people with disabilities are uniquely in need of caretaking; it would 
send the message that we all need insurance against contingencies in life.”). 
 233. See Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimina-
tion, supra note 5, at 541 (presenting a new critique to the antidiscrimination 
approach to disability discrimination based on “fragmenting disability protec-
tion”). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 281. 
 236. Cf. id. at 279 (“Legal protections start and stop in various places with-
in the public realm and may not afford the continuity necessary for meaning-
ful civic or social participation.”). 
 237. Id. at 278 (“The major weakness of this targeted legal approach is that 
individuals’ experiences and needs are not viewed holistically across civic and 
social realms, but in fragments defined by certain legally protected contexts. 
By varying protection based on context, the law fragments the human experi-
ence.”). 
 238. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 
supra note 5, at 541 (“Generally speaking, [fragmentation] results in a patch-
work of protections that do not coalesce to allow meaningful social participa-
tion. More specifically, viewing vulnerabilities as situational creates the false 
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crete legally protected spheres, existing laws stop and start in a 
way that denies the interconnectedness of daily living. Thus, 
current protections may mandate access to a building but not 
necessarily to the services provided within.239 Likewise, a law 
may prohibit an employer from discriminating against a poten-
tial employee on the basis of her disability yet remain silent 
with regard to providing the home-health aide necessary to as-
sist her in getting ready for work.240 Further, restricting legal 
protections to specific circumstances focuses on the context of 
the discrimination or inequality, drawing attention away from 
the structural inequalities that underlie it.241
In response to fragmentation, Satz calls for a blending of 
legal protections related to disability through a lens of “univer-
sal vulnerability.”
 
242 She explains that vulnerability to illness 
and the resulting need for health care is not an issue of disabil-
ity rights, but rather an essential aspect of the human condi-
tion.243 Because universal health care serves the greater good, 
not just those with a heightened need for care,244
 
perception that individuals with significant impairments are not disabled in 
some environments. In addition, a situational approach to vulnerability disre-
gards the benefits of conceptualizing vulnerability as universal for disabled 
and nondisabled individuals alike.”). 
 everyone 
 239. Id. at 544 (“As a result of laws treating vulnerability as arising in iso-
lated transactions rather than as a part of an integrated experience, protec-
tions for disabled individuals are often interrupted, denying meaningful social 
participation. Someone may be able to enter a building but not partake in the 
services offered, for example.”). 
 240. See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 279 (“Thus, a 
fragmented approach to law fails to recognize or appreciate that barriers aris-
ing in an environment the law does not address, such as the home, may impact 
participation in other environments where the law does provide protections, 
such as the workplace.”). 
 241. See Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimina-
tion, supra note 5, at 545 (“Viewing the vulnerabilities associated with disabil-
ity as situational in this way also masks structural inequalities. Disability 
protections that target particular aspects of a disabled individual’s life, such 
as fulfilling the functions of her job or entering an insurance office, shift legal 
focus away from inequalities like wage disparities and health care policies 
that disfavor mental disability.”). 
 242. See id. at 522 (arguing that in order to reform disability law the blend-
ing of civil rights and social welfare models is required). 
 243. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing Satz’s work on 
the universal nature of illness). 
 244. See Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimina-
tion, supra note 5, at 561 (“Viewing illness as universal and constant vulnera-
bility contributes a new perspective on the need for universal health care. Re-
structuring current health care institutions to support health care as a public 
good may be the best way to address vulnerability to illness and the vulnera-
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stands to gain from access to expansive and affordable health 
care.245 Thus, according to Satz, issues of health-care access 
must be addressed outside of the civil rights paradigm, which 
limits its protections to particular groups or traits in specific 
contexts.246 Given her universalist orientation, she is critical of 
scholarly approaches that confine their analysis to the need for 
health law protections—particularly the provision of benefits—
specifically for people with disabilities.247
Both Bagenstos and Satz have explored the deficiencies of 
the civil rights paradigm, albeit in different contexts. 
Bagenstos analyzes how antidiscrimination law has failed to 
have a meaningful impact on employment for people with disa-
bilities because of its inability to target the structural barriers 
underlying their access to work.
 
248 Satz focuses her critique on 
how legal protections stop and start in particular protected 
spheres, thereby undermining the continuity of an individual’s 
actual lived experience.249
 
 Thus, they have urged disability 
rights advocates to look beyond the civil rights model to pro-
mote equality, access, and integration for people with disabili-
ties. 
* * * 
 
While disability discrimination is undoubtedly a social is-
sue, certain individuals with disabilities experience greater 
health-care needs.250
 
bilities that result from illness.”). 
 Although civil rights legislation seeks to 
 245. Id. at 531 (“[A]rguments may be made in the health care context, as 
everyone benefits from broad, affordable coverage, given universal vulnerabil-
ity to illness and other impairments requiring medical attention.”). 
 246. See id. at 552. 
 247. Id. at 522 (“[F]ocusing on the issue of lack of material supports 
. . . both understates and overstates the problem. It overstates it in the sense 
that some of the pressing issues facing disabled persons—such as difficulty in 
qualifying for the protected class or receiving a preferred accommodation, re-
mains tied to protected class status. These issues must be addressed within 
the civil rights framework. It understates matters in the sense that access to 
some material supports, such as health care, is not a disability discrimination 
issue but one of general social welfare.”). 
 248. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 25 (asserting that structural employ-
ment barriers can be effectively attacked, if activists look past the ADA). 
 249. See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 279 (asserting 
that legal protection may not be afforded for civil or social participation be-
cause legal protection is focused within the public sphere). 
 250. See Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 53 (noting that peo-
ple with disabilities have extensive health care needs as a result of their disa-
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promote equality, access, and integration, the Rehabilitation 
Act and the ADA have failed to eliminate the health disparities 
experienced by the disability community.251 People with disabil-
ities still face significant barriers to access and do not enjoy 
health outcomes on par with their non-disabled counterparts.252 
Thus, those statutes have not accomplished their civil rights 
goals in the context of health care. These failures can in part be 
attributed to certain fundamental limitations of the civil rights 
model.253 Civil rights legislation prohibits discriminatory con-
duct but often leaves the bounds of its protection up to judicial 
interpretation. Courts have interpreted the meaning of discrim-
ination very narrowly when it comes to issues of health, 
demonstrating a deference to state programs, insurers, indi-
vidual physicians, and public health officials.254
III.  HEALTH-CARE REFORM AS DISABILITY RIGHTS 
LEGISLATION   
 Health law may 
thus serve as an alternate tool to further disability rights in the 
context of health care. 
On its face, the ACA is a health law.255
 
bility). 
 Congress designed 
the statute to achieve explicitly health-related objectives: to 
improve access to health care and to promote the wellness of 
Americans. It contains provisions that fall into each of the sub-
stantive categories of health law previously discussed: 
(1) public health insurance and government benefits; (2) pri-
vate health insurance law; and (3) public health law. Yet de-
spite its health law purpose and content, the ACA has marked-
ly civil rights results in terms of its potential effect on people 
with disabilities. 
 251. See generally Waterstone, supra note 214 (summarizing the reasons 
that ADA failed to eliminate health disparities for people with disabilities). 
 252. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 1 (asserting that dis-
abled persons experience more significant barriers compared to nondisabled 
persons). 
 253. See Crossley, Becoming Visibility, supra note 31, at 88–89 (asserting 
that ADA’s failure to improve health-care access to disabled persons was at-
tributed to ADA being a civil rights statute). 
 254. See id. at 53 (asserting that courts took a “hands-off approach to 
health care issues”). 
 255. The ACA does contain some antidiscrimination-style provisions, much 
like its predecessor HIPAA. However, the substance of the statute is entirely 
health-related. See generally ACA §§ 2001–202, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
271 (2010).  
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This Part argues that health-care reform could succeed 
where antidiscrimination laws have failed, demonstrating that 
health law can perform the work of civil rights. The ACA, 
therefore, bridges the gap between the health law and civil 
rights law paradigms. It harnesses health law protections to fa-
cilitate the civil rights outcomes of equality, access, and inte-
gration in the context of health care. By taking an active role in 
the reform, disability rights advocates recognized the potential-
ly transformative power of the ACA on disability rights. This 
Part begins by recounting how members of the disability rights 
movement rallied to reform health care. It then performs a 
close reading of portions of the statute that benefit individuals 
with disabilities. Finally, the Article ends by analyzing what 
champions of disability—and other civil—rights can learn from 
health-care reform, concluding that advocates should adopt an 
integrated legal approach to address disparities and to achieve 
access. 
A. HEALTH-CARE REFORM AS A DISABILITY RIGHTS ISSUE 
Despite the disability rights movement’s initial discomfort 
with health law discussed in Part I, advocacy organizations 
recognized the shortcomings of the civil rights approach in tar-
geting the health disparities faced by people with disabilities 
and embraced health-care reform as a necessary tool to pro-
mote disability rights. During the health-care reform debate, 
proponents of disability rights pushed Congress to consider the 
health disparities and wellness concerns faced by the disability 
community.256
Even before the 2010 health-care reform, advocates 
acknowledged health law as a means for promoting disability 
rights. As early as 1994 President Bill Clinton identified the 
significant role health-care reform could play for people with 
disabilities.
 
257 He explained that reforming the American 
health-care system would “finish what the ADA started.”258
 
 256. UNITED SPINAL ASS’N & THE NAT’L SPINAL CORD INJURY ASS’N 
(NSCIA), IMPACT OF HEALTH CARE REFORM ON PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 1 
(2010) [hereinafter USA & NSCIA] (“The disability community has worked to-
gether tirelessly for more than a year to achieve health care reform.”); Joe 
Caldwell, Implications of Health Care Reform for Individuals with Disabilities, 
48 INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES 216, 216 (2010) (“The disability community 
actively engaged in the legislative process and shaped the final outcome.”). 
 
 257. See SWITZER, supra note 77, at 115 (quoting Clinton as saying that 
reforming health care “would finish the business of the ADA”). 
 258. Id. 
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President Clinton, therefore, believed that the ADA alone 
would not achieve the degree of equality, integration, and ac-
cess that the disability rights movement desired. Changing the 
structure and delivery of health care was also necessary. 
In the years following the ADA, proponents of disability 
rights demonstrated a renewed interest in health law as tool 
for their cause.259 In addition to filing civil rights suits, advo-
cates have also lobbied for legislative change in the area of 
health care.260 For example, in the late 2000s, the Promoting 
Wellness for Individuals with Disabilities Act garnered support 
from members of Congress.261 Introduced in both the House and 
the Senate in 2006 and again in the House in 2009, the bill 
would have set standards for accessible medical equipment, 
created grant programs to promote wellness for people with 
disabilities, and instituted training programs for improving the 
disability competency of health-care professionals.262 The law, 
however, never passed.263 All three bills died in committee.264
 
 259. Ten years before Congress passed the ACA, Mary Crossley suggested 
that reforming health care could fill the gaps left by the ADA. See Crossley, 
Becoming Visible, supra note 
 
31, at 88–89 (“[I]t is not fair to judge the ADA as 
a failure in the realm of health care, for the ADA is a civil rights statute, not a 
health-care reform statute. Although persons with disabilities may face barri-
ers to accessing health care to a greater extent than the general population, 
the barriers posed by lack of insurance, underinsurance, and administrative 
constraints on accessing care are certainly not unique to persons with disabili-
ties. Consequently, health care reform that addresses these barriers may play 
a greater role in improving the health care received by people with disabilities 
than the ADA ever can.”). She, therefore, encouraged disability rights advo-
cates to pursue health-care reform. See id. at 89. More recently, Elizabeth 
Pendo has maintained that the ACA provides an alternate avenue to address 
barriers to health-care access that people with disabilities experience, particu-
larly with respect to medical equipment. See Pendo, supra note 150, at 1073 
(stating that the ACA “offers a new approach to these pervasive barriers”); id. 
at 1083 (proposing that “health care reform offers a new and complementary 
approach” for eliminating access barriers for people with disabilities). 
 260. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 55 (“[B]oth the litigation dockets and legis-
lative priorities of disability rights organizations have increasingly focused on 
social welfare rather than antidiscrimination laws. Disability rights advocates 
now frequently bring cases under social welfare law like Medicaid Act as well 
as under antidiscrimination laws like the ADA, and they lobby for changes in 
public health-insurance programs that would enhance the integration and 
employability of people with disabilities. To a far greater extent than commen-
tators have appreciated, the disability rights movement has turned (back) to a 
social welfare approach to disability law.”). 
 261. Promoting Wellness for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 2006, S. 
3717, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 262. Id.; H.R. 1938 111th Cong. (2009); see also Pendo, Reducing Dispari-
ties, supra note 150, at 1072–73 (discussing the Promoting Wellness for Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Act). The bill would have amended the Rehabilitation 
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Disability rights advocates have also actively lobbied for 
legislation to expand Medicaid and Medicare. For example, in 
1999, they played a critical role in passing the Ticket to Work 
and Work Incentives Improvement Act (TWWIIA).265 The stat-
ute extends Medicare benefits for over eight years after a pre-
viously eligible person with a disability re-enters the work-
force.266 Additionally, it expedites the process for reinstating the 
benefits of former recipients of Medicaid or Medicare, who re-
turned to work, but again find themselves “disabled.”267
More recently, in its 2009 report on the state of health for 
people with disabilities, the National Council on Disability ex-
plained that health legislation was essential to address many of 
the barriers that patients with disabilities face in obtaining 
health care.
 
268 Thus, the Council urged reformers to consider 
the needs of the disability community when revamping the 
health-care system.269 It proposed that Congress expand both 
public and private health insurance coverage to facilitate better 
access to care, as well as improve the availability of prescrip-
tion drugs, accessible medical equipment, and assistive aids.270
 
Act to require the Access Board to create and review accessibility standards 
for medical equipment, amended the Public Health Service Act to allow for the 
creation of relevant grant programs, and provided training programs. See id. 
at 1072–73.  
 
 263. See Pendo, supra note 150, at 1073 (stating that the Promoting Well-
ness for Individuals with Disabilities Act was introduced in 2006 and 2009, 
but was not enacted). 
 264. Id.  
 265. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 140 (ex-
plaining the effects of TWWIIA and the role of people with disabilities in its 
passage). 
 266. 42 U.S.C. § 426(b) (Supp. IV 2010); see also BAGENSTOS, LAW AND 
CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 140. 
 267. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(i), 1383(p) (Supp. IV 2010); see also BAGENSTOS, LAW 
AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 140. 
 268. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 16 (“Legislation will 
be required to address some of the key gaps and barriers to health care that 
affect people with disabilities, including access to wellness and prevention ser-
vices, health and health disparities research, development of care models built 
on principles of patient-centered care, and professional training.”). 
 269. Id. at 16 (“Long-term health care reform must include the voices of 
people with disabilities, not only to advocate for improved health care insur-
ance coverage, eligibility, and core benefits, but also to resolve issues of access 
to critical accommodations that ensure that health care is effective, such as 
payment coverage for sign language interpreters and requirements that pro-
viders demonstrate disability cultural competency.”). 
 270. Id. at 96 (“Congress should ensure that reform of the health care sys-
tem in the United States responds to the basic needs of people with disabilities 
by making certain that health care coverage is available and affordable to all 
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This strong support for health legislation—particularly for 
measures expanding Medicaid—exhibited by disability rights 
advocates indicates their acknowledgement that antidiscrimi-
nation law by itself will not achieve the level of integration they 
seek.271
These efforts culminated in the context of health-care re-
form. Disability rights advocates organized, formed coalitions, 
and lobbied for changes to the health-care system that would 
improve the health disparities people with disabilities endure. 
One especially powerful organization was the Consortium for 
Citizens with Disabilities.
 
272 Over one hundred national disabil-
ity rights organizations came together to form that coalition.273 
The Consortium exhorted reformers to view the proposed legis-
lation through what one advocate called the “universal prism of 
disability.”274 Understanding the needs of the disability com-
munity could inform the provision of health care for the general 
population. In other words, as Mary Andrus, Co-Chair of the 
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities Health Care Task 
Force, testified before Congress, “as you look at proposals for 
healthcare reform, look at them through the experience of a 
person with a disability and if the proposal meets those needs, 
it’s highly likely to meet the needs of the rest of the popula-
tion.”275 The CCD and its membership organizations worked ac-
tively to urge Congress to reform health care.276
 
people with disabilities without preexisting condition limitations. Benefits 
made available through either private or public coverage, or a combination, 
must include access to appropriate prescription medications, specialty care, 
care coordination, durable medical equipment and assistive devices, and long-
term care services. Any coinsurance payments must be affordable, and annual 
or lifetime limits on these key benefits must not be permitted.”). 
 
 271. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 69–70 (“[T]he fact that disability rights 
activists have placed such a high priority on the enactment of legislation ex-
panding the Medicaid program is itself telling. It reflects a recognition by dis-
ability rights activists that the ADA alone is not sufficient to achieve commu-
nity integration for people with disabilities. Social welfare law remains 
important as well.”). 
 272. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 218. 
 273. Id. For a list of member organizations, see CDC MEMBERSHIP DIREC-
TORY, http://www.c-c-d.org/members/CCD_Membership_Directory_2011.pdf 
(last updated Aug. 8, 2011).  
 274. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 218–19. 
 275. Healthcare Reform Roundtable (Part I): Hearing of the S. Comm. on 
Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 111th Cong. 32 (2009) (statement of Mary 
Andrus). 
 276. See Letter from the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities to the 
U.S. Congress (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://www.aucd.org/docs/CCD% 
20sign-on%20ltr%20health%20care%20reform%20now%201-28-10.pdf (pre-
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In addition to their participation through the CCD, nation-
al disability advocacy organizations also launched their own in-
itiatives in favor of health-care reform. For example, the Na-
tional Multiple Sclerosis Society adopted a set of National 
Health Care Reform Principles, designed to ensure that legisla-
tive change would address the needs and concerns of the Multi-
ple Sclerosis (MS) community.277 The organization also encour-
aged members to sign and distribute a petition in favor of 
health-care reform.278 Likewise, United Cerebral Palsy posted 
action alerts advising its membership to contact their Senators 
regarding the legislation’s coverage of long-term care supports 
and services.279
State disability advocacy organizations also rallied in sup-
port of reforming health care. In California, the Disability 
Health Coalition issued a report analyzing health-care reform 
and making recommendations with regard to its effect on peo-
ple with disabilities
 
280 and endorsed a series of principles de-
signed to guide lawmakers.281 Similarly, the Missouri-based 
Disability Coalition on Healthcare Reform drafted principles, 
signed by more than sixty organizations, sent to key members 
of the Senate.282
 
senting the signatures of member organizations). For a list of the CCD Health 
Task Force’s activities, see CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES, 
HEALTH TASK FORCE, http://www.c-c-d.org/task_forces/health/tf-health.htm 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2013). 
 
 277. See NATIONAL MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS SOCIETY: NATION HEALTH CARE 
REFORM PRINCIPLES, available at http://www.nationalmssociety.org/ 
government-affairs-and-advocacy/position-papers--policies/index.aspx (ensur-
ing “that programs and activities that benefit individuals living with MS and 
their families receive the funding they deserve”).  
 278. Id. (providing information on how one’s Senators or Representatives 
can join Congressional Multiple Sclerosis Caucus). 
 279. See, e.g., Action Alerts and Updates, UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY, http:// 
ucp.org/public-policy/action-alerts-updates (last visited Apr. 22, 2013) (provid-
ing an example an Action Alerts and Updates).  
 280. DISABILITY HEALTH COALITION: HEALTH CARE REFORM ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.google.com (search “analysis and recommen-
dations” and “health care reform” and disability; then click the hyperlink “En-
sure Greater Accessibility for People with Disabilities in Health”).  
 281. Health Care Reform Principles, DISABILITY HEALTH COALITION (June 
1, 2007), http://dredf.org/healthcare/healthcare.shtml (scroll down to click hy-
perlink “Read the California Health Coalition Health Care Reform Princi-
ples”).  
 282. Letter from the Disability Coalition on Healthcare Reform et al., to 
Max Baucus and Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senators. (June 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.healthpolicyproject.org/Publications_files/USHARE/Medicaidprinci
plesstatesignonletter.pdf.  
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On top of cross-disability coalition building, champions of 
disability rights also joined forces with other kinds of advocacy 
groups. Working together, almost three hundred disability 
rights, faith-based, and elder rights organizations mounted an 
aggressive campaign of grass-roots activism—including phone-
calls, emails, and office visits—to urge members of Congress to 
include long-term care in the reform.283 These efforts were re-
markable not only for their impact but also for their effect on 
future advocacy. Despite certain key shared interests, propo-
nents of disability rights and proponents of aging rights have 
historically operated separately.284 Health-care reform repre-
sents perhaps the first instance in which these two communi-
ties have worked in tandem toward a common goal.285 Support-
ing health-care reform not only aligned people with differing 
kinds of disabilities but also coalesced the disability community 
and advocates for other groups to form a powerful lobby.286 Dis-
abilities rights advocates may have thus laid the foundation for 
important alliances going forward.287
Members of Congress acknowledged these substantial ef-
forts. In describing the groundswell of support for health-care 
reform, Representative Carolyn Kilpatrick cited the work of 
numerous advocacy organizations, including those representing 
the disability community: “[t]he groups expressing their sup-
port include a broad range, including groups representing doc-
tors, seniors, small business, youth, women, persons with disa-
bilities, consumers and patients.”
 
288
 
 283. Caldwell, supra note 
 Senator Harry Reid put a 
256, at 219 (“Over 275 national aging, disability, 
and faith-based organizations coordinated an advocacy campaign on long-term 
services and supports, generating literally thousands of calls, e-mails, faxes, 
and visits to Congressional offices—a force that could not have been mounted 
alone and one that could not be ignored.”). 
 284. Id. (noting that the two communities “traditionally worked in silos”). 
 285. Id. (describing the collaboration as “unprecedented”). 
 286. See id. (“Over 100 cross-disability organization joined together to urge 
Congress to address health disabilities and wellness for individuals with disa-
bilities.”). 
 287. Id. (describing the collaboration between the disability rights and ag-
ing rights communities as “perhaps the most significant outcome of health re-
form”). This new alliance may well prove useful in future efforts to protect dis-
ability rights. See id. (“Although the rhetoric of health care reform in the 
popular media focused on the politics of division, there are powerful lessons to 
be learned in the disability community about working together to effect 
change, lessons we must carry forward as we move forward to implementation 
and ‘the work begins anew.’”). 
 288. 155 CONG. REC. H12,893 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
Kilpatrick) (emphasis added). 
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human face on the need for reform, by reading several personal 
letters from individuals with disabilities describing the barriers 
they faced obtaining affordable health care.289 Lastly, perhaps 
echoing President Clinton’s remarks in the mid-nineties, Sena-
tor Tom Harkin described the proposed increase to state Medi-
caid funding for deinstitutionalizing people with disabilities as 
“a dream of the disability community since we passed the 
Americans With Disability Act [sic] in 1990.”290
As stated, the ACA has a decidedly health law purpose and 
structure. However, given the involvement of disability rights 
advocates in the push for reform, it is not surprising that the 
resulting legislation contains many provisions that will both 
explicitly and implicitly benefit the disability community.
  
291
B. IMPACT OF THE ACA ON PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 
 In-
sofar as health-care reform facilitates equality, access, and in-
tegration for people with disabilities, the ACA can be under-
stood as a disability rights law.  
Health-care reform will benefit the disability community in 
a number of a ways.292
 
 289. 155 CONG. REC. S13,645 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Reid) (drawing from several letters from constituents). 
 In particular, people with disabilities 
will enjoy expanded access to public and private health-
insurance coverage and recognition as a health disparities pop-
ulation. Thus, while the ACA is decidedly a health law in terms 
of its purpose and content, by promoting access, integration, 
and equality in health-care provision for people with disabili-
ties, it will have a civil rights effect. This Article focuses on the 
ACA’s positive impact for people with disabilities in the context 
of the three substantive areas of health law described in Parts I 
and II: (1) public health insurance and government benefits; 
(2) private health insurance; and (3) public health, specifically 
health disparities research. 
 290. 155 CONG. REC. S13,848, (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Harkin) (describing the six percent increase to state Medicaid funding for en-
acting legislation implementing the integration mandate articulated in 
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999)). 
 291. See Caldwell, supra note 256, at 216 (stating that the lobbying efforts 
of the disability community shaped the legislation). 
 292. See, e.g., id. at 216–18 (describing the positive impact of the ACA on 
individuals with disabilities). See generally USA & NSCIA, supra note 256.  
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1. Public Benefits and the ACA 
The ACA contains several provisions designed to expand 
and improve the public benefits system. These changes will 
benefit individuals with disabilities given their reliance on 
Medicaid and Medicare for health-insurance coverage.293 While 
disability rights advocates successfully pushed to expand Medi-
care and Medicaid in the late 1990s,294 those changes failed to 
eliminate significant shortcomings, mainly Medicare’s limited 
eligibility for non-elderly individuals and its lack of adequate 
coverage for assistive devices.295 The ACA addresses some of 
these deficiencies. For example, the legislation expands the 
Medicaid program. As written, the ACA would extend Medicaid 
eligibility to anyone under 65 with an income at or below 133% 
of the Federal Poverty Level, effective January 2014.296 States 
could receive the additional funding provided under the statute 
early by extending their coverage immediately.297 However, if a 
state did not expand its Medicaid program by the deadline, it 
would lose the entirety of its Medicaid funding.298
The broadening of Medicaid came under attack during 
2012. In his plurality opinion in National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts analyzed 
the constitutionality of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provi-
sions.
 
299 He—along with Justices Breyer and Kagan—concluded 
that the severity of the accompanying penalty rose to the level 
of coercion, thereby exceeding Congress’s authority under the 
Spending Clause.300
 
 293. See supra text accompanying note 
 Instead, the plurality decided that, while 
Congress could withhold additional funding for a state’s failure 
35 (describing the reliance of people 
with disabilities on public insurance). 
 294. See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text. 
 295. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 141 (“Med-
icare was designed for a nonworking elderly population and does not serve the 
interest of the people with disabilities in community integration and to the la-
bor market.”). 
 296. ACA §§ 2001–202, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 271 (2010); see also 
USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 5.  
 297. ACA §§ 2001–202; see also USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 5 
 298. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (Supp. V 2011) (explaining that if a state does not 
comply with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions “further payments will 
not be made to the State”).  
 299. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) 
(plurality opinion). 
 300. Id. at 2607 (stating that Congress is not free to penalize states that 
choose not to partake in the new program by taking away existing Medicaid 
funding). 
  
2013] DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW 2023 
 
to comply with the Medicaid expansion, it was unconstitutional 
to threaten existing funding.301
Yet even if a majority of states adopt the ACA’s expansion 
of Medicaid, merely increasing coverage for public benefits may 
not be enough to have a lasting impact.
 Thus, following the ruling, 
states may choose whether to expand their Medicaid programs 
without jeopardizing the funds they received prior to the ACA. 
302 Both Medicaid and 
Medicare have historically failed to provide adequate benefits 
for at-home assistance for individuals with disabilities.303
The statute improves services and supports for people re-
quiring long-term care.
 As a 
result, disability rights advocates also lobbied for—and won—
better coverage for on-going, at-home health services during 
the health-care reform debate. 
304 The ACA strengthens the Money Fol-
lows the Person (MFP) Program to facilitate transitioning indi-
viduals from institutions to community placements.305 It also 
creates the Community First Choice (CFC) Option, designed to 
support state Medicaid plans in offering community-based care 
in conjunction with nursing homes and institutions.306
 
 301. Id. 
 CFC 
 302. See BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 141–
42 (arguing that expanded coverage is not sufficient to address disparities ad-
equately); see also Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 61–62 (explaining that one type 
of limitation is the institutionalization of Medicaid). 
 303. See BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 141–
42 (describing the need for at-home services and the proposed Medicaid Com-
munity-Based Attendant Services and Supports Act); see also Bagenstos, su-
pra note 5, at 68. 
 304. USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 4 (describing provisions designed to 
expand support for at-home and community-based services); Caldwell, supra 
note 256, at 217 (“The healthcare legislation contains a robust package of re-
forms on long-term services and supports, including the Community Living 
Assistance Services (CLASS) Act and improvements in Medicaid.”). 
 305. ACA § 2403, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 304 (2010) (amending Sec-
tions 6071(b) and 6071(h) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a (Supp. V 2011)). The ACA extends the program through 2016, 
supports its continuation in twenty-nine states, adds thirteen new states, and 
expands eligibility. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Affordable 
Care Act Supports States in Strengthening Community Living (Feb. 22, 2011), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/02/20110222b.html; see 
also Money Follows the Person, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/ 
Medicaid-CHIP-program-Information/By-Topics/Long-Term-Services-and 
-Support/Balancing/Money-Follows-the-Person.html (last visited Apr. 22, 
2013).  
 306. ACA § 2401. 
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mandates that states provide recipients with assistance for dai-
ly living, not just those activities related to health.307
It is also worth noting that the legislation, as passed, in-
cluded the much-contested Community Living Assistance Ser-
vices and Supports program (CLASS Act).
 
308 The CLASS Act 
would have established a voluntary, national insurance pro-
gram designed to provide affordable community living services. 
The program, which would have applied to individuals in need 
of on-going care and support,309 was fraught with controversy. 
On February 1, 2012, the House voted to repeal the CLASS 
Act.310 Although the Obama administration did not support the 
legislative repeal, it had already deemed the program unwork-
able as of October 2011.311
Advocates for people with disabilities hope that, taken en 
masse, these changes to public health insurance will improve 
health-care delivery for the disability community, as well as the 
American population as a whole.
 
312
Health-care reform expands public health insurance both 
in terms of the individuals who are eligible and the types of 
services it covers. As noted, people with disabilities may re-
quire more health services but have habitually encountered 
barriers to access, leading to widespread health disparities. 
Certain individuals with disabilities did not qualify for public 
benefits, and those that did may still have been unable to ob-
tain needed care because of restrictions on coverage. However, 
by increasing eligibility and bolstering coverage, the ACA’s 
changes to public health insurance hold the promise to elimi-
 
 
 307. Id. 
 308. See Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300ll (Supp. V 2011). 
 309. A determination by a “licensed health care practitioner” that an indi-
vidual has a “functional limitation,” as defined by the statute, “expected to last 
for a continuous period of more than 90 days” triggers benefits under the 
CLASS Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-2(a)(1)(C). 
 310. Paige Winfield Cunningham, House Votes to Repeal Part of Health 
Care Law, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012, at A4. 
 311. Id.; see also N.C. Aizenman, Long-Term Care Program Scrapped, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2011, at A1. 
 312. See Caldwell, supra note 256, at 219 (explaining that “the disability 
community challenged the very concept of health, moving the discussion be-
yond the narrow confines of acute care to a more inclusive framework of func-
tioning, well being, and community participation”). Absent the efforts of disa-
bility rights advocates, the long-term care provisions would not have been 
included. Id. (noting that “long-term services and supports, which were abso-
lutely nowhere on the initial policy agenda, are included in the final legisla-
tion”). 
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nate at least some barriers previously experienced by people 
with disabilities and, consequently, to reduce existing health 
disparities. Thus, while these provisions fall under the health 
law umbrella substantively, insofar as they promote access, in-
tegration, and equality for people with disabilities, they will 
make a civil rights law impact. 
2. Private Health Insurance and the ACA 
Similarly, several modifications to the private health-
insurance system will positively affect people with disabilities. 
The legislation does away with a number of health-insurance 
practices that have disproportionately disadvantaged individu-
als with disabilities. Effective immediately, health insurers can 
no longer impose lifetime caps on benefits.313 In 2014, annual 
caps will be likewise prohibited; however, in the meantime, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services can choose to restrict 
annual caps.314 The caps on lifetime and annual limits are sig-
nificant for people with disabilities because of their increased 
need for health services.315
The ACA also restricts decisions related to eligibility and 
underwriting decisions. The new law immediately creates a 
“pre-existing condition insurance plan”
 
316 and, when it takes 
full effect, will eliminate preexisting condition exclusions in 
both group and individual coverage.317 Further, the law prohib-
its discrimination in underwriting; by 2014, group and individ-
ual insurers can no longer use health status when making eli-
gibility decisions.318
Finally, the legislation will prevent insurers in the indi-
vidual and small group markets (as well as the large-group in-
surers participating in the exchanges) from relying on health 
 
 
 313. ACA § 1001, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 130 (2010) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (Supp. V 2011)); see also USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 
2. 
 314. ACA § 1001; see also USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 2. 
 315. See Caldwell, supra note 256, at 216. 
 316. ACA § 1101 (instituting a coverage option for individuals who have 
been denied insurance because of a preexisting condition); see also Pre-existing 
Condition Insurance Plan, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://pcip.gov/About_PCIP 
.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 317. ACA § 1201 (“A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offer-
ing group or individual health insurance coverage may not impose any preex-
isting condition exclusion with respect to such plan or coverage.”). 
 318. Id. 
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status when setting rates.319 As of 2014, the relevant health in-
surers must rely on the following four factors: (1) individual vs. 
family coverage; (2) geographical location (community rating); 
(3) age; and (4) tobacco use.320
Additionally, at least some of the barriers people with dis-
abilities experienced obtaining routine preventative care prior 
to reform resulted from inaccessible equipment, such as scales, 
X-ray equipment, and exam tables.
 Eliminating caps on coverage and 
the consideration of health-related factors in underwriting and 
rating decisions will have a positive impact on individuals with 
disabilities. Again, the effect of these changes can be under-
stood in civil rights terms because they eliminate policies and 
practices that have disadvantaged people with disabilities. Do-
ing away with those impediments will allow people with disa-
bilities to obtain needed health care more readily, leading to 
better access and fewer inequalities. 
321 Pursuant to the ACA, the 
Access Board, a federal agency charged with facilitating access 
for people with disabilities, will develop standards for medical 
diagnostic equipment.322
3. Public Health and the ACA 
 These provisions will help remove 
some of the structural barriers that have impeded health-care 
access for people with disabilities. Thus, they likewise serve 
disability rights by promoting equality, access, and integration 
in health-care delivery. 
Health-care reform also institutes several changes to pub-
lic health law that impact people with disabilities. Significant-
ly, the ACA is among the first federal legislation to recognize 
people with disabilities explicitly as a health disparities popu-
lation. Historically, “health disparity” has not had a consistent 
meaning.323 The National Institutes of Health Working Group 
has defined the term as “differences in the incidence, preva-
lence, mortality, and burden of diseases and other adverse 
health conditions that exist among specific population groups 
in the United States.”324
 
 319. Id. 
 Previously, health disparities research 
 320. Id. 
 321. See Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1059–65. 
 322. ACA § 4203. 
 323. Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1076 (noting that 
“‘[h]ealth disparity’ is a fluid term meaning many things to different agen-
cies”). 
 324. Id. at 1077 n.129 (quoting Press Release, Nat'l Inst. of Health, NIH 
Announces Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities (Sept. 27, 
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has focused almost exclusively on racial and ethnic minori-
ties.325
Among the goals of health-care reform was reducing health 
disparities across multiple populations.
 
326 The ACA marks one 
of the first occasions that Congress has recognized people with 
disabilities as a population with its own specific health-care 
needs.327 The legislation provides that—in addition to tradi-
tional health disparities populations—federally funded or sup-
ported health programs must collect and report data on disabil-
ity.328 The ACA allocates funds for the “development, 
evaluation, and dissemination of research, demonstration pro-
jects, and model curricula for cultural competency, prevention, 
public health proficiency, reducing health disparities, and apti-
tude for working with individuals with disabilities.”329
 
2010)). 
 Further, 
the legislation requires the federal government and federally 
funded entities to compile and report data on disability and 
health-care delivery. The Department of Health and Human 
Services must ensure that all federally supported health care or 
public health programs collect data regarding where people 
with disabilities access care, the availability of accessible facili-
ties and medical equipment, which providers serve people with 
disabilities, and the extent of their disability competency train-
 325. The Minority Health and Health Disparities Research and Education 
Act of 2000 defines “minority group” as “racial and ethnic minority group.” 42 
U.S.C. § 287c-31(c)(3) (2006); see also Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 
150, at 1077 n.130 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 287c-31). 
 326. See ACA § 3011 (establishing a national strategy and priorities that 
includes improving health outcomes for all populations and “reducing health 
disparities across health disparity populations”). 
 327. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 217 (“This is one of the first times in fed-
eral legislation that health disparities for individuals with disabilities have 
been acknowledged with other minority populations and will assist with ad-
vancing future efforts.”). 
 328. ACA § 4302. To be clear, the legislation does not explicitly designate 
people with disabilities as a health disparities population. Instead, it lists 
“disability status” alongside traditional health disparities groups. Id.; Pendo, 
Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1077 (“Although the section does not 
specifically provide that individuals with disabilities will be recognized as a 
health disparity population, this provision does include ‘disability status’ 
among previously recognized disparity populations and affords the same re-
search benefits to this population.”). 
 329. ACA § 5307(a); see also USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 7–8 (ex-
plaining that the ACA provides grants and other incentives to create programs 
and model curricula for “disability awareness training to help reduce the 
health disparities that exist for people with disabilities”). 
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ing.330 Disability rights advocates considered the inclusion of 
individuals with disabilities in this research as a “significant 
victory” for the disability community.331
C. INTEGRATED PROTECTIONS: LESSONS FROM THE ACA 
 The civil rights impli-
cations of designating disability as a health disparities popula-
tion are two-fold. To begin, it has an expressive value. Includ-
ing the disability community alongside other socially 
recognized groups acknowledges that, like racial and ethnic 
minorities, people with disabilities have experienced systematic 
discrimination. More practically, compiling research will allow 
health-care providers to better serve people with disabilities, 
thereby reducing the disparities they currently experience. 
The ACA thus constitutes a departure from the historical 
schism in substantive legal protections for people with disabili-
ties between the health law and civil rights law paradigms. De-
spite its health care purpose and substantive provisions, 
health-care reform effectively functions as a piece of disability 
rights legislation, by improving access to health care and facili-
tating equality and integration in its delivery.332
 
 330. ACA § 4302; see also Caldwell, supra note 
 Moreover, giv-
256, at 217; USA & NSCIA, 
supra note 256, at 8. 
 331. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 217. 
 332. That is not to say the ACA is perfect with respect to its treatment of 
people with disabilities. Substantial room for improvement still exists. In the 
realm of private health insurance—even with the elimination of preexisting 
condition exclusions, health status-based rating, and caps—people with disa-
bilities may still experience disadvantage, even after the ACA takes full effect. 
For example, employers can offer their employees reduced premiums for par-
ticipating in wellness programs, initiatives designed to promote healthy living, 
in the hopes of lowering health-insurance costs down the line. ACA § 1201 (de-
scribing wellness programs). These employer-sponsored wellness programs 
could have an unintended adverse effect on certain individuals with disabili-
ties. USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 8. Specifically, people with disabilities 
may not be able to participate in qualifying exercise regiments or other 
measures at the same rate as workers without disabilities. Id. (explaining that 
“a person with a disability may be unable to participate in an exercise pro-
gram or another benchmark of the wellness program”). Consequently, disabled 
employees may not be eligible for the reduced premiums offered through the 
wellness programs, putting them in a position of disadvantage relative to their 
non-disabled colleagues. Id. Thus, advocates of disability rights have urged the 
disability community to take an active role in developing the qualifying pro-
grams by providing guidance to the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices. Id. 
Moreover, while the ACA as of 2014 eliminates health status-based rating 
for certain insurers, the new factors could likewise negatively impact people 
with disabilities. Geographic location, age, and tobacco use are all crude prox-
ies for health. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 1191. Thus, if health insurers dif-
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en the interrelatedness of health care and access to other kinds 
of social goods such as employment,333
With its use of health law to attack disparities and to pro-
mote access, the ACA represents a new approach to protecting 
disability rights. Although on its face the ACA is health legisla-
tion, the impact of several of its provisions sound in the register 
of civil rights. The statute can thus be understood as a health 
law that also functions as a disability rights law. However, this 
analysis does not end with health-care reform. The ACA pro-
vides a useful case study to demonstrate how integrating sub-
ject-specific legislation into the civil rights arsenal can further 
the rights of people with disabilities, as well as other historical-
ly disadvantaged groups. Thus, health-care reform demon-
strates that non-civil rights statutes can have civil rights ef-
fects, a useful insight in the context of people with disabilities 
and health care, and beyond. 
 the civil rights effect of 
the ACA extends beyond the health-care context, thus laying 
the groundwork for the improved social standing of people with 
disabilities in other areas. 
The nature of discrimination has changed since the first 
generation of civil rights laws passed.334
 
ferentiate on the basis of those factors, they will end up disadvantaging the 
same individuals, albeit according to less accurate risk assessment criteria. Id. 
at 1191–94. The ACA can, therefore, be understood to eliminate facial discrim-
ination on the basis of health status, but still have a disparate impact. Id. 
 Lawmakers initially 
Additionally, as Elizabeth Pendo has pointed out, while the ACA makes 
great strides in terms of ensuring the increased availability of accessible medi-
cal equipment, it leaves much to interpretation. Pendo, Reducing Disparities, 
supra note 150, at 1080–83. The Access Board will create guidelines for manu-
facturers and providers to follow; however, the term “meaningful access” re-
mains ambiguous. Id. at 1081. The current law is silent as to just how much 
accessible equipment is enough. Id. This conundrum is no new problem for is-
sues of access—similar issues have arisen in the context of Title II of the ADA. 
Id. 
Further, although the ACA recognizes people with disabilities as a health 
disparities population, it does not designate them as “medically underserved.” 
The “medically underserved” designation holds special significance because it 
is connected with several federal programs designed to address health dispari-
ties and to facilitate access to health care. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 217. 
While people with disabilities meet many of the criteria necessary to qualify as 
medically underserved, including heightened levels of poverty and infant mor-
tality, they have never been formally recognized as such. Id. Disability rights 
advocates have, therefore, encouraged the disability community to take action 
regarding their recognition. Id. 
 333. See supra notes 220–32 and accompanying text (discussing 
Bagenstos’s scholarship on this point). 
 334. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60 (2001) (explaining that 
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designed those protections to combat the intentional, categori-
cal exclusion and subordination of people of color and women.335 
Thus, the wrongful conduct envisioned by the statutes was out-
right and explicit differential treatment on the basis of group 
status.336 Yet, even after the enactment of those laws, dispari-
ties persisted, leading scholars to speculate as to the cause of 
the continuing inequality. Many concluded that implicit bias 
and institutional structures combine to form a more subtle va-
riety of second-generation discrimination.337 Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, legislation designed to attack first-generation discrimina-
tion has done little to dismantle the infrastructures responsible 
for second-generation discrimination.338
The civil rights paradigm is, therefore, a product of an ear-
lier era in which overt discrimination and outright exclusion 
were the order of the day. While those protections remain nec-
essary to the antidiscrimination project, acting alone, they are 
no longer sufficient. A world dominated by second-generation 
discrimination requires a more complex legal regime to address 
persistent structural inequities through actively promoting the 
 
 
the “[s]moking guns—the sign on the door that ‘Irish need not apply’ or the 
rejection explained by the comment that ‘this is no job for a woman’—are 
largely things of the past”). I borrow the “first generation” and “second genera-
tion” terminology from Susan Sturm’s seminal article on structural inequality.  
 335. Id. at 465–66 (“The first generation employment discrimination cases 
mirror the social and political conditions that led to the adoption of the civil 
rights legislation. Workplace segregation was maintained through overt exclu-
sion, segregation of job opportunity, and conscious stereotyping. Dominant in-
dividuals and groups deliberately excluded or subordinated women and people 
of color.”). 
 336. Id. at 466 (identifying the “wrong” of first generation discrimination 
as “deliberate exclusion or subordination based on race or gender”). 
 337. See, e.g., id. at 460 (explaining that “second generation manifestations 
of workplace bias are structural, relational, and situational”); Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5–15 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, The Structural Turn] 
(summarizing the literature on structural inequalities and attributing those 
disparities to unconscious bias and workplace structure); see also Tristin K. 
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account 
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003); Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 
(1995). 
 338. Several scholars have weighed in regarding how to address the prob-
lem of second-generation discrimination, including Bagenstos and Satz. See 
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 337 (arguing for a moderate ap-
proach to structural discrimination); Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the 
Limits of Antidiscrimination, supra note 5, at 550 (citing the universal vulner-
ability perspective as a means to address second-generation discrimination). 
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rights of historically disadvantaged groups. The integrated le-
gal approach, therefore, has two key components: (1) civil 
rights legislation (including claims for disparate impact) to at-
tack discrimination and exclusion; and (2) non-civil rights legis-
lation to confer substantive benefits. Just as issues of health-
care availability and access necessitated a health law para-
digm, disparities in different areas likewise require integrating 
other legal frameworks into the civil rights project. 
The ACA can be read as conferring a number of rights and 
benefits on people with disabilities. Perhaps most clearly, the 
changes to the public health insurance system, including Medi-
caid expansion and increased supports for at-home care, confer 
tangible health-care benefits on qualifying individuals with 
disabilities. Less obviously, the changes to private insurance 
can also be read as creating certain entitlements. Pursuant to 
the mandate (with few exceptions), people who are not insured 
publically must acquire health insurance.339 The legislation 
contains provisions to facilitate access to private insurance 
where there had not been access in the past, such as the tempo-
rary high-risk pools for people previously denied health insur-
ance because of preexisting conditions, the low-income subsidy, 
and the state exchanges.340 These policies and programs—read 
alongside the ACA’s prohibitions on caps, preexisting condition 
exclusions, and health status-based rating described above—
can be understood as allocating a right to access health insur-
ance where one had not previously existed. Moreover, some 
have even argued that the legislation may create a private 
right of action for discrimination in private health insurance.341 
Finally, the changes to public health law also benefit people 
with disabilities. The legislation allocates funds to address 
health disparities for the enumerated populations.342
 
 339. ACA § 1501, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 242 (2010) (amending the 
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), to require “applicable individu-
al[s]” to obtain minimum essential coverage). 
 Thus, rec-
ognizing people with disabilities as a health disparities popula-
 340. See ACA § 1311 (providing consumer choice through health exchang-
es); ACA § 1331 (providing flexibility to states to establish health programs for 
low-income individuals not eligible for Medicaid); Press Release, 
HealthCare.gov, Temporary High Risk Pool Program (July 1, 2010), available 
at http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2010/07/temp-high-risk-pool 
-program.html. 
 341. See, e.g., Sarah G. Steege, Finding a Cure in the Courts: A Private 
Right of Action for Disparate Impact in Health Care, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
439 (2011). 
 342. See supra notes 329–31 and accompanying text. 
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tion brings with it federal monies. While not a direct, individu-
al entitlement like Medicaid benefits, the allocation of funds 
specifically to address the health disparities people with disa-
bilities face represents a federal benefit designed to promote 
the civil rights goals of equality, access, and integration in the 
context of health care. 
Taking a lesson from the ACA, this Article proposes an in-
tegrated approach, that is, using substantive, non-civil rights 
protections in conjunction with antidiscrimination protections. 
The ACA itself exemplifies the integrated legal approach to 
disability rights by including its own civil rights-style protec-
tion. In addition to the beneficial provisions outlined above, the 
ACA also includes a nondiscrimination section that indicates 
federally funded health programs cannot discriminate on the 
basis of disability and identifies the Rehabilitation Act as the 
proper enforcement mechanism.343 It also authorizes the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations 
implementing that section.344 Thus, the ACA recognizes the du-
al nature of the health disparities that face people with disabil-
ities—the problem is both a matter of health-care access and a 
matter of civil rights.345
Importantly, advocates should not abandon the civil rights 
paradigm: its statutes serve important expressive and practical 
functions. On one level, civil rights laws frame the inequities 
they target as social problems.
 
346 On another, civil rights laws 
provide a means to attack discriminatory conduct.347
The integrated approach is not specific to health law (or 
even to disability). As the following example demonstrates, ad-
vocates have been combining civil rights laws and other types 
of legislation for decades to allow comprehensive coverage. 
 Thus, pro-
ponents of disability rights should continue their support for 
the civil rights paradigm, both to keep disability rights framed 
as a social issue and to combat the more traditional forms of 
discrimination, even as they grow increasingly rare. 
 
 343. USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 8. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Elizabeth Pendo has made a similar observation. See Pendo, Reducing 
Disparities, supra note 150, at 1058 (“The reframing of barriers and dispari-
ties faced by people with disabilities as an issue of health care access and qual-
ity under the [ACA]—in addition to an issue of civil rights under the ADA—
appears promising.”). 
 346. See SWITZER, supra note 77, at 91 (describing the symbolic relevance 
of civil rights law as a remedy). 
 347. Regrettably, overt discrimination has not disappeared. 
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However, identifying this phenomenon as an effective strategy 
for combating inequalities and promoting access and integra-
tion allows reformers to bring this strategy to the forefront of 
their legislative agendas. 
Education for minor children provides a useful example of 
integrated legal protections for people with disabilities outside 
health law. Congress originally passed the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), formerly the Education for 
All Handicapped Children Act, in 1975.348 The law provides 
funding to states for “special education and related services” for 
children with disabilities.349 Although schools are not required 
to maximize a student with a disability’s potential,350 school 
districts must provide a free and appropriate public educa-
tion.351 The Rehabilitation Act and either Title II or III of the 
ADA also apply in educational settings.352
Because IDEA allows parents of children with disabilities 
to challenge “any matter” related to a child’s ability to obtain a 
free and appropriate education,
 The special education 
legislation and the civil rights legislation serve different, yet re-
lated purposes.  
353 courts have held that claims 
against a school district that are “educational in nature” are 
“presumptively redressable” through IDEA’s administrative 
process, and therefore subject to its exhaustion requirement.354 
However, when parents Bob and Karen Ellenberg sued on be-
half of their daughter S.E. under IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, 
and the ADA, the Tenth Circuit held that their failure to ex-
haust the administrative remedies available under IDEA did 
not bar their other claims.355
 
 348. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006). 
 The court justified its decision to 
treat the civil rights claims separately because the Ellenbergs 
were “unable to obtain relief under the IDEA for their pure dis-
crimination claims brought pursuant to the [Rehabilitation 
 349. Id. § 1411(a)(1). 
 350. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 351. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 352. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination in federally supported 
or conducted programs. 29 U.S.C. ch. 16 (2006). Title II of the ADA prohibits 
discrimination by public entities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2006). Title III of 
the ADA applies to public accommodations. Id. §§ 12181–12189. Depending 
how they are funded schools may be covered by a combination of these provi-
sions. 
 353. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). 
 354. See Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1275 
(10th Cir. 2000). 
 355. Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Inst., 478 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2007). 
  
2034 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1963 
 
Act] and ADA.”356
In a world of second-generation discrimination, traditional 
civil rights legislation, acting alone, may not achieve the de-
sired levels of equality, access, and integration for historically 
disadvantaged groups. Thus, advocates should look outside the 
confines of the traditional civil rights model and support sub-
ject-specific legislation that confers tangible rights and bene-
fits. While this Article focuses on people with disabilities, the 
integrated approach could likewise aid other populations who 
face structural inequality. 
 Although IDEA mandates a free and appro-
priate education and the provision of special education and re-
lated services, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act provide con-
current yet complementary protection by prohibiting schools 
from engaging in discriminatory practices. Thus, both kinds of 
laws, working together, are essential to a meaningful education 
for children with disabilities. 
Given the positive impact it could have for people with dis-
abilities, the ACA demonstrates that a statute within the 
“health law” paradigm may also function as a “civil rights law.” 
Health law and traditional civil rights law can work together to 
promote access and to reduce disparities. The use of non-civil 
rights legislation, in addition to existing antidiscrimination 
protections, represents an integrated approach to advancing 
the interests of historically disadvantaged groups. People with 
disabilities and health-care reform are but one example. This 
legislative strategy, which combines prohibitions on discrimi-
nation and exclusion with benefits designed to facilitate access 
and integration, may have currency in other areas of the law 
and for advocates of other subordinated populations. 
  CONCLUSION   
The Affordable Care Act was a watershed moment for dis-
ability rights. Advocates of the disability community launched 
expansive campaigns and forged powerful alliances to ensure 
that the resulting legislation would address the significant 
health disparities they faced. However, this strategy represents 
a significant departure from the early part of the disability 
rights movement, when champions of disability rights actively 
shunned health law protections. 
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act constitute valuable 
symbolic victories by recognizing disability as an antidiscrimi-
 
 356. Id. (emphasis added). 
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nation category. However, those laws had a limited impact in 
achieving equality, access, and integration for the disability 
community, particularly in the area of health care. Although 
those statutes apply to health-care providers, people with disa-
bilities continued to experience notable health disparities, due 
in no small part to the structural barriers they have historical-
ly encountered securing adequate insurance and obtaining 
needed services and devices. The civil rights paradigm was not 
the proper instrument to address the issues underlying those 
inequities. As a result, disability rights advocates rallied 
around Congress’s effort to reform health care. The legislation 
thus contains many provisions that will benefit people with 
disabilities. 
The Affordable Care Act represents a sea change for pro-
ponents of disability rights. It demonstrates that health law 
can function as civil rights law. It also exemplifies a particular 
approach to achieving antidiscrimination goals. The Affordable 
Care Act works with existing civil rights statutes to provide a 
comprehensive web of legal protections that both outlaw dis-
crimination and promote access. By integrating other kinds of 
substantive protections into their civil rights agenda, advocates 
can address the subtle, second-generation discrimination that 
perpetuates existing inequalities. Moreover, the integrated le-
gal approach could have broad implications for civil rights pro-
ponents generally, not just for disability rights. While glimmers 
of this strategy already exist within the antidiscrimination pro-
ject, fully embracing it as a legislative agenda and a tool for 
change might garner substantial benefits for historically disad-
vantaged groups. The Affordable Care Act will have lasting 
benefits for people with disabilities, both in terms of its sub-
stantive protections and as a model for future reform, in health 
care and beyond. 
